

# Failure of the State - Nation Building and the Rise of the Failed state in Afghanistan; its Threats to the National Security of the Islamic Republic of Iran

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## Abstract

*State-nation building highlights security for both the country involved and its neighbors. The state-nation-building process and the formation of a national government are important issues in Afghanistan's political and social life. Since September 11, 2001, the United States has sought to lead the Afghan community in line with its priorities by playing a role in the nation-building process, and by establishing a liberal democracy based on Western values in Afghanistan, to make this land a model for other countries in the region. Changes following the fall of the Taliban, particularly the activities of terrorist groups, have shown insecurity is on the rise. The new government and security agencies were not very effective at removing traditional patterns of authority, and the failed government as a whole would be the future of Afghanistan. If state-nation building in Afghanistan leads to substantial success, it will contribute to regional peace and stability, but there is evidence that state-nation building has failed in Afghanistan, which has disastrous political, security, and economic consequences for regional countries, especially for Iran. The failure of state-nation-building in this country has resulted in the emergence of a failed government that can undermine the Islamic Republic's national security in the political (development of ethnic disputes and religious extremism, military and terrorism), social (increase in migration, drug trafficking), and challenge the environment and the Hirmand issue.*

**Keyword:** *State-nation building, failed government, political identity, national security, threats*

## 1. Introduction

Afghanistan, under the influence of national, regional and international trends, has become a center of violence and terrorism. Violence in the country has been under the influence of domestic (regional conflict) and regional (regional actors) and trans-regional actors (inter-regional interventionist forces) trends. In the domestic field, the role of political identities in the creation and perpetuation of political instability and the failure of state-nation building is more prominent than any other component. The fall of the Taliban and foreign intervention paved the way for an international nation-state. But tensions between Afghanistan's political identities have so far led to failure and in practice have led to the formation and continuation of a failed

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government structure. Eighteen years of military presence, expansion of Taliban activities, rising drug production, and an inability to create a sustainable economy have exacerbated the failure of this process, and the phenomenon of failed government now dominates.

The intensification of terrorist activities is the forcible transfer of power, the inefficiency of political institutions, and the insecurity of the present-day features of Afghanistan following the international nation-state administration by the United States.

The role of creating sub-national identities is prominent in the current situation in Afghanistan. The gap between the state and the nation has led to the ineffectiveness of Afghan national identity politics. This situation has fostered the growth of sub-groupism against the ruling government and the widening social divisions around ethnicity and religion resulting from post-Taliban political instability in Afghanistan. This makes Afghanistan a priority for neighboring countries' security policy. Long geographical boundaries, ethnic and linguistic differences, especially in border regions and shared cultural trends, will pose major threats to Iran's current situation. For this reason, the subject of Afghanistan has always been of interest to policymakers and analysts, and a great deal of research has been carried out on the developments in Afghanistan, some of which have been outlined below to show how they have responded to the main question of this research and the innovation of the research. What's online?

Some of these studies argue that in order to solve Afghanistan's problems, its neighbors must integrate this isolated country into their economic relations and convergent agreements. But Afghanistan has a number of challenges within it that challenge the lack of sovereignty in its relations with its neighbors and engage them in Afghanistan. Marvin Weinbaum's report, *Afghanistan and its Neighbors: An Always Dangerous Neighborhood* holds this view (Weinbaum, 2017: 7). Some of the work has looked at the issue internally, believing that Afghanistan failed to form a modern nation-state, and there is now an overnight government that is prone to many identity crises. Turning state actors into peace talks with the Taliban indicates that there is a parallel force with the central government and 16 years of war has made no difference. Afghan groups have not had a democratic approach to the country, and with the Taliban empowered, it is expected that Afghanistan will not see peace in the future. The first one is in his article "Afghanistan's Vague Future, Scattered Realities, and Incomplete Geopolitical Lines" (Ruohomäk, 2016: 11)

Some of the work has focused on the role of Afghanistan's neighbors but has not addressed the consequences of the Afghan situation for its neighbors. Georg Bruno, for example, in an article entitled "Iran and the Future of Afghanistan" believes that the United States should accept Iran's role in Afghanistan's stability. Iran has a higher regional power capacity than any of Afghanistan's other neighbors. If the process of the state-nation building fails to create stability and security in Afghanistan, Iran will, in the future, face a country full of crisis situations that will have to make changes in its foreign policy. Iran's appeal to the Taliban is in this regard (Bruno, 2013: 8). In fact, they have not addressed the implications of the Afghan situation for Iran, including in the area of security. Using a descriptive-analytical approach, utilizing written and virtual sources, this article seeks to explain the threats to government-nation-building in Afghanistan after 2001 that led to the emergence of a failed government that has been addressed. Has the Islamic Republic of Iran? Following the conceptual framework, the factors of instability and failure of government-nation-building in Afghanistan, the emergence of the failed government in Afghanistan, and finally the threats posed by the failure of the government-nation-building and the emergence of the failed government in Afghanistan will be expressed on the security of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

## 2. Conceptual Framework: Copenhagen School and Failed State Model

The conceptual framework of this paper relies on two models. The Failure of State Theory holds that when state power networks fall into a large, sustained and recurring collapse, the governments of that state cannot design and apply real power unitedly, a failed state is formed (Kazemi, 3: 2016). The Peace Foundation, as illustrated in the table below, since 2005, has indexed failed states in the Twelve Indicators.

**Table 1. 12 Failed State Indicators**

1- Security conditions	2- The gap between the political elite
3. Economic stability	4. Uneven development
5. Brain Escape	6. The legitimacy of the government
7. Public Services	8- Human rights and the rule of law
9. Demographic pressures	10. Refugees
11. External intervention	12- The gap between the political elite

Source: <https://fragilestatesindex.org/comparative-analysis/>

In the framework of the theory of failed State and according to the above indicators it should be said:

1. The failed State does not monopolize military power and terrorist groups seize the power to exert military power within society and extend it to other countries (Soltani, 2017: 7).
2. The failed State has critical interactions, especially regarding its neighbors. These states are unable to resolve the crises resulting from their situation, hence their dependence on superior power continues to become a model of conflict (Jackson, 1990: 177).
3. These States are indifferent to their commitments to the people and lose their capacity to serve as a source of political value. Citizens thus substitute loyalty to subgroups for their support of the state (Rotberg, 2003: 5).
4. These States have fragile civil society and underdeveloped institutional structures that analyze the areas for controlling political tensions in these societies. This level of inability can provide the ground for the collapse of law and order in these states and provide the conditions for full-scale separatism and civil war (Howard, 2014: 42-44).
5. The inefficiency of legitimate political institutions is another component of these governments. The political systems of these governments are often ruled by a dictator. Political institutions are the result of colonial policies or dictatorship against the nation. Thus the crisis of national identity is prominent in these states. In these countries, nationalism, the superiority of a people or tribe in political structure, outweighs civil nationalism (Yoo, 2011: 37).
6. Another component of a failed States is economic instability and the inefficiency of economic prosperity. The World Bank calls such States "low-income countries under pressure". (Kazemi, 4: 2016).

In Jackson's view, these states are unable to operate within the framework of the anarchic order of stable states, exacerbating the state of anarchy with regard to their situation and posing a threat to their regional neighbors and the international system. Because they are unable to control violence and are defeated by terrorist groups. These groups easily extend their activities from these countries to several other countries in the region. In Jackson's view, the international community is intervening militarily in the context of humanitarian intervention in these countries, resulting in a worsening failure. Because state-building is an internal process (Jackson, 1990: 177-181).

The Copenhagen School is one of the main approaches in international relations that focuses on post-Cold War security studies and the widespread changes in security. According to this school, the survival of the state and of state actors is no longer just threatened by military components, but must also be added to other thematic, political, economic, environmental, and social domains in Bozner and Weaver's view under the new circumstances. Security has lost its traditional meaning and has changed. In the new era, we are seeing the expansion of security across multiple military, economic, environmental, political, and social dimensions (Buzan, Weaver, 74: 2009).

According to this school, while security is multidimensional, threats are no longer confined to one country's borders, and this is due to interdependence. In fact, the change in the form and nature of the threats has led to increased dependence on international actors. For multi-dimensional analysis of security, it is necessary to understand the impact of all variables affecting security such as culture, geography, ethnicity, identity, environment, civilization and religion (Adler, 2008: 120). The issue of Afghanistan and its threat to Iran can be explored in a way that affects both Iran's security and the region as a whole. In fact, the Afghan security threat is not a matter for a single government. The dimensions of security in this school are as follows. A. Military Security: Security in the military component has a heavy shadow on human history. Armed competition and increased military capabilities aimed at monitoring and analyzing the international environment were the most important ways of securing. The state was at the center of this security (Buzan, 141: 2011). In fact, this dimension of security rarely saw the role of non-state actors in this space.

B) Political Security: Perhaps the most prominent aspect of political security in the field of political security is the discussion of sovereignty and its resulting institutions. The political threat has always been to the institutional stability of the state. The purpose of the threat may range from pressure on the government on a particular policy to the overthrow of the government, disintegration, and disruption of the political fabric of government to undermine it prior to a military invasion. (Buzan, 124: 2011). Because the government is essentially a political entity, a political threat can be just as dangerous as a military threat.

C) Economic security: The importance of the economic dimension to the survival of citizens and its impact on key sectors of the country, such as education, health, and increased military capacity, have brought this issue to greater attention. In the area of economic security, it can be argued that the economic threat is undoubtedly the most difficult and complex one in the context of national security. The relationship between economic and military capability is well known. The state's military capability depends on the ability to supply important strategic goods and support the armed forces (Mendel, 140: 1379). Energy security is one of the new challenges of security issues that are very important as the world economy progresses and the need for fossil fuels and energy resources to be transferred.

D) Social Security: Today, national security is no longer merely a military one. And perhaps the lack of social security and threats to citizens, such as lowering life expectancy, is more important than military security for national security. Just as social threats cannot be easily separated from political threats. In government-to-government relations, a significant external threat at the social level relates to an attack on national identity that is subject to political considerations (Chena, 2008: 32). The main problem with social security threats is that most of them are inside the country.

E) Environmental security: The environmental security plan has caused this aspect of security that was previously overlooked to be taken into consideration because of its pervasive nature. The development of new high-tech weapons, climate change, water scarcity, health risks, and growing needs, and energy are key indicators of this security dimension (Behnke, 2006: 11). The issue of "nuclear emissions" is another important issue that makes the effort to refurbish nuclear weapons not only militarily but also environmentally necessary.

### **3. State-Nation Building in Afghanistan and Political Development**

With the Mohammed Dawood Khan coup against the reign of Mohammed Zahir Shah in 1973 that led to the formation of the republic, the power structure in Afghanistan enters a process that has brought the hidden crisis of legitimacy into a violent and overt crisis. The Islamic religion, which formed the basis of society's moral and legal foundations, was also vulnerable and transformed into a semi-secular system that did not adhere to Islamic principles in practice. The Dawood Khan system could not become a national movement in Afghanistan. The Communist coup against him eventually destroyed all the works and reforms he wanted. The coup was the beginning of a crisis that spanned nearly three decades of Afghan history, with the Communist regime ruling it (Lee, 2018: 264).

As the Marxists came to power in Afghanistan and anti-Islamic laws were put in place, the Mujahideen guerrillas rose up against them, and shortly after the Marxist government sought help from the Soviet Union. The Red Army entered Afghanistan in 1979 and in 1988, with the loss of nearly 2,000, more than 6,000 were wounded. The Communist government led by Mohammed Najibullah opposed the Mujahidin for several years and finally fell to the Mujahidin after a five-year battle in Kabul in 1992. After the fall of the Communists and the arrival of the Mujahidin in Kabul, the Mujahidin Alliance of the Seven failed to reach an agreement and the conflict between the parties began for various reasons (Arnold, 2009: 78).

For the first time since the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the political form of Afghanistan was formally in the hands of the Tajik people under the presidency of Burhanuddin Rabbani. By not accepting these conditions, the Pashtuns wreaked havoc on Afghanistan by launching a two-year civil war. Under these conditions, the third Taliban, mainly Pashtuns, became a major hub of power in 1994, with more than 2% of Afghan territory occupied. With the fall of Mazar-e-Sharif in 1997, the Taliban proclaimed its existence and recognized Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE (Bowman, 2009: 7). However, violent rivalry by Afghan groups did not allow for a stable government.

Afghanistan provided the Taliban with the entry of other terrorist groups into the country. In this regard, the Taliban's increased engagement with al-Qaeda and its leader bin Laden was prominent. Eventually, the events of September 11, 2001, in the United States at the hands of al-Qaeda forces prepared the ground for a US military invasion of Afghanistan in the context of pre-emptive war. This military invasion provided the second round of international nation-statehood in Afghanistan based on Western liberal values (Nojumi, 2002: 128). However, the second experience of state-state-building as the Soviet model has so far failed and the result has been the same, the emergence and continuation of a failed state.

#### **3.1. Factors of Instability and Failure of State-Nation-Building in Afghanistan**

The lack of national boundaries and the measurement of all components of Afghan society in the balance of tribal culture and the dominance of this culture has made tribal culture the sole key factor in the nation-building process in Afghanistan. Sometimes if one comes to the status of government or political power, one must use ethnicity as a ladder or a backbone. Afghan political elites have historically been the cause of their victory for power. In tribal thought, national thinking and giving rights to a person other than his or her own nation is denied (Melazehi, 2007: 1 - 2).

The dominance of tribal culture in Afghanistan's politics, economy, culture, and society has made access to modernization, democracy, nation-building, and state-building, national identity, and development are difficult. In tribal culture, the status of individuals is determined not by their knowledge or expertise but by their tribal background. Therefore, this culture is in opposition to development and rejects any constructive change in society. The obstacles to the

state-nation building are the domination of the tribal lords who seized the political power of the country through zeal and other antagonism. Hence, any kind of constructive transformation is seen as tearing down their identity (Gregory, 2012: 17). None of the Afghan governments have been based on the free and open vote of the people. The government in this country was ethnic or clan and the other ethnicities did not make any significant contribution to political decision-making.

These unequal rules are also seen at the sociological level. All non-Pashtun ethnic minorities were required to pay taxes and military service, but Pashtun tribal men were not only exempt from taxation and military service but also received salaries. Legislative assemblies, such as the Levi's Jirga and the Shura Council, were not real representatives of the nation because they were elected not on the basis of population and population but on the basis of administrative units; There is a significant population gap between districts and provinces (Sharma, 2016: 85).

State-nation building without political development is unlikely, but political development in Afghanistan's authoritarian presidency is unlikely. The great weakness of the centralized presidency, where all local officials and rulers in provinces and heads of administrative units of the center are determined, is the lack of trust and distrust between them and the people. They appear more in the role of governor in provincial administrative units than in the role of servants for the people and law enforcement. When the state has created national thought, it can actively promote and guarantee the participation and activity of the people in politics, and the belief that people have a stake in the government. This feeling is realized through the participation and horizontal distribution of power to create a balance in the centralization of power (Dehshyar, 2009, 12). However, Afghanistan has no centralized power in reality to decentralize.

This same degree of limited stability has often been due to foreign assistance. Since the fall of the Taliban, Afghanistan has been the largest recipient of international aid. Afghanistan's dependence on these aid accounts for 71 percent of GDP, the highest level of international aid. Most donor countries and organizations include Afghanistan with the US \$ 5 billion, European Commission \$ 1.2 billion, the UK \$ 850.9 million, Germany \$ 729.5 million, Iran \$ 560 million, World Bank 553.3 million The dollar, Canada were \$ 457.2 million, the Netherlands 2885.8 and Italy 266.8. More than ten international forums have been held to help Afghanistan develop (Zazai, 2018: 15-22). In summary, all of these meetings have been committed by other countries to assisting the Afghan government, with less attention being paid to the internal challenges of the Afghan community in the path of nation-building. However, these have not helped to create a successful nation-state. Causes of this failure include:

### **3.1.1. Political, Social and Cultural Structure:**

In connection with the formation of the national government, the Afghan political system was on the path of centralizing tribal and ethnic family power and then unstable left and right ideological states. The gain of political power through conflict and war and through external support was the reality of these states. The social structure has also led to the division of society at a time of cultural and social backwardness. The tribal cultures of the nations are in conflict with each other and impede the development of a national culture that requires the formation of a nation-state. The majority of people consider their ethnic and tribal goals in their political and social decisions and activities. In other words, cultural pluralism based on attributable values prevails over social pluralism based on acquired values, which provides grounds for greater prejudice and crisis development. The ethnicization of politics in Afghanistan drives political leaders to use ethnicity as a tool against the formation of a nation-state (Beehner, 2006: 104).

### 3.1.2. Lack of A Clear Picture of Shared National Values and Interests

Although the existence of multiple groups and ethnicities in one country does not necessarily mean the absence of a common identity and by describing the existence of ethnicities in Afghanistan it cannot be concluded that national identity has not been formed in Afghanistan, but the situation in Afghanistan is due to a tendency to attribute values including ethnicity. And religion has led to a lack of a common understanding of a national identity. Shared national identity plays an important role in state-nation building. National Identity in Afghanistan Different ethnic groups define their interests and interests. Afghanistan faces two identity gaps, ethnicity and religion (Shiite-Sunni).

Pashtuns have always tried to impose their identity as a national identity, and the Sunni majority, on the other hand, has always been violent in dealing with Hazara Shiites. In fact, identity conflicts have made these identities prisoners of Afghan geography who are forced to live in geography called Afghanistan, not a country with a single national identity. Language in Afghanistan, which is more closely linked to ethnicity, plays an influential role in nation-building. The relation of ethnicity to language has led to greater political and social separation (Barfield, 2016: 11).

**Table 2. Major Ethnic-Linguistic Groups in Afghanistan**

Ethnic group	Population percentage	Language	Islamic sect
Pashtun	40	Pashto	Sunny
Tajiks	25	Persian Dari	Often age
Millennia	20	Persian Dari	Shia
Uzbeks	7	Uzbek	Sunny
Turkmen	3	Turkish	Sunny
Baluchis	3	Baluchi	Sunny

Source: Weinbaum, 2017:7

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Tensions in Afghanistan's ethnic and religious groups have always been in line with the interests of neighbors and have doubled the situation. Most of these identities are associated with identical identities in neighboring countries, especially the federal districts of Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Iran. Crisis in a similar identity in a neighboring country prepares for the likelihood of a crisis spreading to neighboring countries and vice versa. On the other hand, almost all of these identities are associated with the Taliban, preferring localism and local values over nationalism (Landinfo's reports, 2016: 14).

### **3.1.3. Economic Factor**

The economic poverty and deficit of government spending caused by this poverty and the corruption of the government are pulling Afghan governments into permanent dependence on foreign aid and disrupting it leading to the collapse of the government. This is one of the obstacles to the formation and conduct of the nation-state process in Afghanistan. Economic poverty in society has also been a cause, as it has deprived the public of its ability to reach national and social issues and the public's interest in participating in political and even social activities that are part of the requirements of nation-building. And the climate of poverty is not created again by poverty (World Bank, 2018).

### **3.1.4. Geography**

The challenges of Afghanistan's geographical position in nation-building vary from one dimension to another. From an external point of view, Afghanistan, as a country in the midst of colonial powers, has consistently been a field of competition. Combining regional allies with competing international powers added to the complexity of these games. The negative effects of this game can be studied in political instability, while political stability is one of the key elements of nation-state building. Afghanistan's geographical structure is also challenging and problematic for the nation-state. The mountainous situation and the dispersal of populations with multiple ethnicities across the valleys and rural and isolated life make the phenomenon of nation-building inaccessible in Afghanistan. Rural life and the difficulty of connecting the center to all areas of Afghanistan have always undermined government control. This weakness undermines the areas of government presence and influence that can promote modern values and the exercise of sovereignty (Nami, 2008, 53-55).

Insecurity in Afghanistan, including internal factors such as specific geopolitical situations, the existence of different ethnicities, the weakness of the central government and the lack of economic development has provided the country with a growing background for achieving a successful nation-state. This situation has only one consequence for Afghanistan today, and it is the development of a failed government with its own characteristics.

## **4. The Components of a Failed State in Afghanistan:**

Neither foreign aid nor domestic components have led to the formation of a successful nation-state in Afghanistan, and the result has been the emergence of a failed state structure with the following components.

### **4.1. Lack of Security**

Security is the most important political commodity of any state, including crime prevention, empowering citizens to resolve disputes with the government and itself. In this context, there is also the question of good governance, which has features of high political participation, the tendency for consensus, accountability, transparency, and efficiency and effectiveness. These reduce corruption and minority views are taken into account in decision making (Unescap.org, 2014: 1-3). The Afghan government is inefficient in providing security. As such, the country is involved in the phenomenon of separatism and tendency towards localism. The World Peace Index released by the Institute for Economics and Peace has ranked Afghanistan high in 2017 on the basis of 23 indicators, including violent crime, countries' militarization levels and arms imports. Afghanistan is the second most insecure country in the world after Syria. In the South Asian region, Afghanistan has a degree of insecurity. Afghanistan is one of the countries in

crisis in this index. The Taliban now control half of Afghanistan. The plan to withdraw 7,000 US troops from Afghanistan suggests that the central government should take on the fight against the Taliban alone. Therefore, the possibility of starting a civil war is high (Malley, 2019).


#### 4.2. Political Institutions and Administrative Inefficiency

Afghanistan, as an example of failed states, often had an undemocratic political system that was formerly ruled by a dictator or a particular ethnic or religious group, and now ethnic tensions prevail over the seizure of power. In this country, political institutions are the result of colonial policies or dictatorship against the nation. Therefore, this government is facing a national identity crisis. In this country, ethnic nationalism, i.e. the superiority of a tribe or ethnic group in the political structure, overrides civic nationalism (Michigan Report, 2015). In Afghanistan, civil society and influence groups are all about attribution values. From birth, a person is considered to be a member of a particular ethnic or tribal group. The result of cultural pluralism is the conflicting gaps that impede peaceful reform. It ranks 148th in the world in terms of Global Democracy Index in 2018 (The Economist, 2017: 7-11).

#### 4.3. Inefficiency of government authority

Failed states become inefficient because they have no influence throughout the territory and there is a great deal of escapism in their society. There is also no guarantee of authority in such societies. Taliban activities and community tendencies in Afghanistan indicate the government's inefficiency. According to the Fair Governance Index in 2018, Afghanistan has scored 12 out of 40 in respect of political rights. In the area of civil liberties, out of 60, the country was 14th. The government's efficiency percentage was 29 percent. The country's rule of law was only 14%. However, the country had a 59 percent freedom of information period (Millennium report, 2018).

The crisis of statehood in these societies also encompasses the crisis of elite solidarity, itself a precursor to the crisis of distrust that creates gaps between both the elites and the people and provides the polarization of society, which is a major obstacle to political participation. The continuation of these conditions leads to the formation of a management crisis that results from the relevance of theocracy over meritocracy. Because the speed of accumulation of unsolved problems is slower than the speed of implementation of solutions, which results in extreme dissatisfaction with the system and social explosion. The recent Afghan presidential election and tensions between Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah illustrated the situation. This situation has reduced the overall process of legitimacy in this country.



## **Chart 1. The General Process Of Legitimacy In Afghanistan**

Source: [Http://Fundforpeace.Org/Fsi/Country-Data/](http://Fundforpeace.Org/Fsi/Country-Data/)

According to the chart above, the indicator that goes up to 100 indicates the deteriorating legitimacy situation in the country. The situation of legitimacy has worsened since 2010.

### **4.4. Spread of Terrorism**

Contrary to the goals of the state-nation building project in Afghanistan, it has had the most terrorist acts in the world since the US military invasion until 2018. In 2017, 18,814 people were killed in terrorist attacks worldwide. This year, Afghanistan is ranked as one of the top terrorist acts in the world. According to the Global Terrorism Index, the score of 10 stands for the highest number of terrorist acts in the country of destination, with Afghanistan scoring 9.74 out of 180 countries (Global Terrorism Index, 2018: 13).

Taliban efforts in Afghanistan have tripled since 2006 in 2017. The group is focusing its 2017 attacks on civilians and police forces, killing 2419 Afghan soldiers this year. In 2016, that number was around 1782. The number of Taliban attacks also increased from 369 to 386. 54 percent of Taliban attacks have been through bombings and suicide attacks. From 2001 to 2017, about 32,000 people were killed in terrorist attacks. Parties to the war in Afghanistan Given the Taliban's influence in the country, they have accepted the role of the Taliban and negotiated with the group after 15 years of war. More than 20 terrorist groups are fighting against the Afghan government. Some of them are: Haqqani Network; Al-Qaeda Network; ISIL; Lashkar-e-Taiba; Lashkar-e-Jhangvi; Jaish Mohammed; Mujahideen Alliance Council; Mawlawi Group; TTP;

The Afghan government is one of the most important examples of a failed government in the world. In fact, the US government-nation-building project not only failed to save the country but exacerbated the phenomenon. This situation has made Afghanistan a threat both within and in relation to its neighbors.

## **5. Threats of the Failure of the State-Nation Building Government and the Failed State of Afghanistan on Iran's Security**

US military aggression although overthrowing the Taliban, Iran's eastern and ideological enemy, did not bring about a favorable change in the Afghan situation, and continues to pose multi-dimensional threats to the security of the Islamic Republic of Iran through failures in state-building and failed government. Which they refer to.

### **5.1. Military-Terrorist Threats**

Continued military-terrorist threats in Afghanistan have increased Iran's military spending since 2001. Insecurity inside Afghanistan has led the Iranian government to bear the cost of border protection, and given the extent of the border, this protection has sometimes been circulated between the army and the IRGC. Situations on the country's eastern borders require foreigners, Taliban and smugglers in Afghanistan to monitor a precise threat system. The presence of these elements in Afghanistan does not preclude the possibility of military conflict (Bozgermari, 77: 2010). In particular, NATO forces are still in Afghanistan and Iran has not been included in the NATO framework as a partner.

In the current situation, ISIL activities in Afghanistan are very likely to develop. Iran has paid more military and humanitarian costs to combat ISIL in Iraq and Syria than any other

country in West Asia, and the expansion of its activities in Afghanistan exacerbates military threats to Iran. Because Iran will be caught in a crisis of crisis from west to east. In particular, the UAE and Saudi Arabia have also focused on the use of Pakistani-Afghan military-terrorist capacity against Iran. ISIL is now most active in Nangarhar and Farah provinces adjacent to Iran's borders. Elements of Pakistani, Chechen, Tajik and Iranian nationalities have been reported in ISIL in Afghanistan. ISIL is keen to seize areas of Farah, Helmand and southern Afghanistan, which border Iran. 90% of Afghanistan's opium is produced in Helmand and due to Iran's transit route, these forces will increase in the form of smuggling convoys in the future (Hawramy, 2018). Iran militarily is now clearly in competition with ISIL and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Taliban support because it views ISIL as more dangerous than other insurgent groups in Afghanistan.

## 5.2. Political Threats

The most important threat to Iran in the current situation in Afghanistan comes from the issue of political threats. Political threat refers to a spatial phenomenon that reflects the realm of intellectual and ideological sovereignty of the state. It is in this territory that culture, economics, and other components of power development, and its threat is the threat of real sovereignty and territorial geography of the country. In other words, when a country's political threats align with its geographical boundaries, the capacity for threatening and insecurity within the country increases dramatically (Soltani, 2017: 11). Iran's political threats to Afghanistan are threatened by factors such as the rise of extremism, the treatment of the Hazaras and the increasing role of trans-regional actors in the Afghan environment. The importance of Iran's political threat to Afghanistan is greater than any other Iranian political threat to other neighbors. Because Iran in Afghanistan is linked to two Islamic and ancient components.

In this context, the formation of a Western-style state can limit Iran's political influence in the country. In particular, with Trump's 2017 strategy, the United States is seeking to offset its withdrawal by increasing its political influence in the Afghan elite. This situation is exacerbated when it is recognized that the Afghan economy is heavily dependent on foreign aid, with the West contributing more than 70% (Lalkovic, 2017: 7). By keeping Afghanistan in its umbrella of support, the United States could affect a range of South Asian nations.

Ethnic issues in Afghanistan can also affect Iran's political and sovereignty. Lack of a strong government and weak civil society are exacerbating ethnic crises. The country's civil institutions have not only been able to break ethnic boundaries but have intensified them and are thus a factor in spreading ethnic, local, and cross-border disputes. This is particularly prominent in relation to the Baluchis and the expansion of political influence by the opposition regimes of Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (The Jerusalem Post, 2015). The formation of an independent Balochistan state of Balochistan between Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan has been one of the cornerstones of the sectarian crisis that threatens Iran more than the other two. In particular, some Baluchi leaders from three countries have aligned themselves with this policy.

Another political threat in the field of religious extremism is the development of terrorist acts and groups. The withdrawal of Western forces leaves the central government alone against Taliban and ISIL groups, leading to a weakening of relative stability in Afghanistan. The Afghan government has announced that more than 5 Afghans have been involved in ISIL. Some reports indicate that while the Taliban has about 5,000 troops in Afghanistan, ISIL has recruited 4 Native forces there and seized control of parts of Jalalabad (Behraves, 2019). One of the goals of ISIL's presence in Afghanistan is to disrupt Iran, as one of their goals to reach Central Asia is to undermine Russian security.

The emergence of ISIL in Afghanistan will further exacerbate the political reversal of the values of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. This revolution took place on the basis of values such as jihad, self-sacrifice, martyrdom, Mahdism, and justice, and ISIL is now using these same values to continue its actions. Such actions cause the mentality of the secular countries of the region to define ISIL in line with the product of the Iranian revolution and thus intensify the tendency against religious values throughout the region (Najafi, 2015: 45). However, in order to address these threats, Iran needs to ally with other countries in the region, such as West Asia.

### **5.3. Hydro-politics Environmental Threats:**

The biggest environmental issue between Iran and Afghanistan is the issue of Hirmand water, the status of Hamoun and Herirood. In the importance of water resources, especially Hirmand, in the Afghan economy, it is a term in Afghan society that "Kabul can live without gold, but never without snow". The Hirmand River Basin has a population of more than seven million. Afghanistan, a high-water country, Iran has occupied a low-lying country for years, and Afghan officials believe that our water resources are the source of others' oil resources and consider it a commodity. The issue of water in the two countries' relations that could affect the economic development policies of both countries in the common border regions. The dependence of the two countries' border regions on a single source for economic development has highlighted the role of water in the two countries' politics. Dependence on one source and absolute management of one country on it and its unilateral use creates insecurity for another (Hanasz, 2012: 8). Therefore, due to the water resources of Hirmand and the sharing of Lake Hamoun on the border of the two countries, it has become a challenge for the eastern region of Iran.

Afghanistan's need for post-Taliban economic development, coupled with a shortage of rainfall in Iran, has worsened the situation and has destroyed 140,000 hectares of Iranian land in the east. Recently, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani has highlighted the policy of "water for immigrants" in his speech by forcing Iran to increase its acceptance of Afghan immigrants to address some of Afghanistan's domestic issues (Aman, 2017). Reduction of Hirmand water to Hamoon has had the following consequences for Iran:

- 1- Changing the process of migration of birds, destruction of migratory animals and aquatic habitats
2. Destroy unique streams and ground cover of Hamoon wetland and threaten area animals such as Sistan cattle.
3. Changing the quality of potable water and salting of the agricultural lands of the region and ultimately increasing the migration rate of the inhabitants of the area.
- 4- Expanding 120-day sandstorms and increasing respiratory diseases
5. Increasing the use of people for smuggling of goods, fuel, and drugs (Stiftung, 2016: 9).

Herodotus is also in crisis. Research by the Institute for Strategic Studies in Afghanistan shows that the water level of Herirood has declined by nearly 2 percent from the period of 1-8 to the period of 5-6. The origin of this river is Afghanistan. Due to the inability of the Afghan government to develop an economy that is not dependent on water resources, and with the decline of Afghanistan's water resources, the issue of Harirood water has become a concern in Kabul, and its officials in the context of "water diplomacy" have adopted policies on this river for Herat's economic development. Followed by the development of the dam (Aman, 2016: 11). The failure of a failed government has made Afghanistan unable to reach lasting agreements with Iran on the right. Although this is a duel situation and the existence of a stable government in Afghanistan that needs economic development, it is in dire need of water resources and may still have current water disputes with Iran.

#### **5.4. Socio-cultural Threats**

Failed governments have the highest rates of indigenous population migration. Syria has been ranked one in the world in terms of immigration since the 2011 crisis and Afghanistan is in second place. The inability of the Afghan government to improve economic, social and security conditions, especially after the Taliban, could not stop the process of Afghan migration to neighboring countries. According to Amnesty International, half of the current Afghan immigrants to Iran have migrated to Iran since 2005 (Amnesty International, 2019). Indeed, the failure of nation-state building in this country that has led to the failure of a failed state has been characterized by the features already mentioned. Such a situation has increased immigration.

The first threat in this area is the issue of immigrants. More than 90 percent of Afghan immigrants live in the country because of their shared ties with Iran. According to 2017 statistics, there are 951.142 thousand Afghan refugees registered in Iran, 97% of whom live in urban areas and 3% in rural areas. The Iranian government estimates that there are between 1.5 and 2 million illegal immigrants in Iran. Seventy percent of these immigrants are Hazaras and Tajiks. In 2018, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHR), in a three-day visit to Iran, called for further assistance to Iran to improve the situation of Afghan refugees (UNHR, 2018).

Two issues of marriage and citizenship are the challenges posed by the presence of these immigrants in Iran. Marriage to Iranian nationals and the uncertainty of the children of this citizenship, or the unregistered marriages and the identity of the offspring of these links have always been a challenge for Iran. If these marriages are not protected by law, the official authorities, including the courts, have no duty to resolve the problem, on the other hand, as to marriages, alimony, and other matters that are mainly obtainable with the support and judgment of the judicial authorities. Marriage is not a burden. In particular, the offspring of this marriage does not have the right to education due to a lack of birth certificates (ISNA, 2016). Of course, all of these include the marriage of an Afghan man to an Iranian woman.

The issue of citizenship of these people has always been a challenge between the government and parliament in recent years. Granting them citizenship means increasing the government's commitment to providing equal services. Such a marriage is now being applied for, and the government has announced that it will not be able to cash in on it. However, these people receive hidden subsidies. According to 2014 statistics, in Mashhad alone, 5,000 marriages of an Iranian girl with an Afghan man are registered, resulting in 3,000 identifiable children. While the number of illegal marriages with Afghan nationals is 20,000, the result is 22,000 stateless children (UNODC, 2018).

#### **5.5. Economic Threats**

Afghanistan's bad economic conditions, along with uncertain conditions, have always sent a significant portion of its population to Iran in hopes of a better life. This immigrant population often lacks the expertise to help the Iranian economy, but rather enter into the false jobs and labor of Iran. The result of this process is the destruction of the labor market for the citizens of Iran. In particular, such a force is desirable in every respect for Iranian employers. The use of cheap foreign labor for employers will result in at least a 30% cost reduction; this process, although beneficial to the producer, increases the unemployment rate of indigenous workers. Therefore, it is natural for some employers to employ foreign workers at work (IRNA, 2016). While in developed countries, the immigrant labor force is often from the elite of the origin and skilled communities, due to the situation in Afghanistan, the lack of skilled workers does not play a significant role in Iran's economic growth.

In 2014, about 190,000 Afghans were issued work permits in Iran. Two million Afghan workers own 10 percent of Iran's job market. The average age of over 75 percent of Afghans residing in Iran is between 15 and 25 years. Of the three million Afghan refugees currently living in Iran, about two million of them are legally and illegally employed (300,000 legal and with a work permit and illegal residency) in the Iranian job market and their share of the employment market 21 The country's million people (17 million men and 4 million women) make up nearly 10 percent. While there are more than 4 million unemployed young Iranians in the country and the unemployment rate in the country is 15-20%, the presence of nearly two million Afghan workers in the country's market has hit the economy and the employment market, causing further problems. It will also come in the future (Althiamenia 14: 1394)

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Afghan workers extract more than \$ 5 billion of their monthly and annual income through legal and illegal means. The report also notes that there are currently about 500,000 residential homes in the country for rent by Afghan nationals living in Iran, indicating that Afghan immigrants living in the country use a significant share of the country's welfare services annually. And impose high costs on the country's economy. Afghanistan's economic situation is not enough to build economic growth in Iran. Most of its agricultural production overlaps with Iran. On the other hand, insecurity in the country increases the risk of investment. As a result, Iran's major economic focus has been on the border with Afghanistan (Azami, 7: 1395). The current situation in Afghanistan may not only deprive Iran of its economic opportunities in this country, but the presence of Afghan immigrants and drug production will make the economic situation in Iran unfavorable and affect the growth of trafficking.

## 6. Results

Given Afghanistan's role in Iran's strategic environment and the direct and indirect impact of Afghanistan's developments on Iran's national security, the recent process of government-nation-building in Afghanistan can affect the national security of the Islamic Republic and threaten the political, security, economic and cultural aspects of the country. And to create a community for the Islamic Republic of Iran. The post-Taliban situation in Afghanistan and the failure of the nation-building process have created challenges for Iran to engage with its neighbor. In fact, neighboring Iran's foreign policy inevitably focuses on Afghanistan's security situation. The situation in Afghanistan does not imply a normal relationship with Iran, but it has become a security issue for Iran that, irrespective of its status, challenges Iran in various areas of security. The challenges of this neighborhood and these relations for Iran are even more pronounced. In the field of terrorism, Afghanistan remains a paradise for these groups, and with the development of ISIL activities in Iran, Iran will face a cross-border terrorist group. Unless the Afghan government is able to overcome these challenges that are all rooted in the country, Iran is likely to face a complex security environment with its eastern neighbor in the future.

The failed Afghan government situation will continue to engulf Iran with the crisis of immigration and its aftermath. The Afghan economy remains dependent on drug production, and this terrorism-narcotics link, as a financial tool for terrorist groups, will challenge Iran as the best route to transit drugs. On the other hand, the presence of US troops on the eastern borders and the use of tense capabilities are preparing the ground for escalating insecurity in Iran. In particular, the US does not seem to want to release the geographical blockade of Iran, especially in the east. Therefore, the United States will not allow the situation in Afghanistan to go in the best interests of Iran.

The Taliban regime in Afghanistan cannot be described as a strong government with 12 cases in Table 1. In fact, what is in Iran's interest in reducing threats is the formation of a strong and stable government of all groups in Afghanistan. Because such a government does not have

consequences such as political inefficiency, economic instability, lack of security, and things that have been described as a failed state, and consequently threats to neighbors are reduced.

## Acknowledgments

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