

## Analysis of Identity Political Movements in Regional Head Elections in DKI Jakarta

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### Abstract

*The existence of Muslims as the majority in the DKI Jakarta elections shows their aspirations and existence as dominant forces. This can be seen in the distribution of political aspirations to fight for leaders who want to uphold Islamic values and struggles, in addition to considering the existence of Islamic political parties as the aspirations of Islamic struggle organizations. In this context the role of community organizations is very visible. Some even consider this as part of the identity politics of Muslims. This study uses qualitative research methods with a literary and contextual approach. The results of the study stated that there was a large role of Islamic mass organizations in this election event for DKI Jakarta.*

**Keywords:** Identity Politics, Governor Election, DKI Jakarta

### 1. Introduction

Local political temperatures began to warm up. The trigger was the implementation of the democratic contestation in the Regional Head Election whose peak was scheduled to take place on June 27, 2018. The heat of local politics took place in 171 regions that would be held in the 2018 elections. It consisted of 17 provinces, 39 cities and 115 districts that joined the general election of Indonesia. Indonesian people choose their leaders to determine the direction of their lives over the next 5 years in improvements in the political, economic, social, cultural, legal, and security fields. This previously started with the process of the DKI Jakarta Capital City Election for the period 2017-2022 and won by AniesBaswedan surpassed Basuki TjahyaPurnama (AHOK) and took place very tight. The fight involves religious and ethnic issues that bring emotions not only to voters in Jakarta but also a large portion of the Indonesian population, given that the Jakarta election has received wide coverage.

The elections in DKI Jakarta have left serious problems in the form of psychological wounds and unmatched heartaches. In the midst of the commotion, the DKI Regional Election has caused many people to become ill. Losing supporters or winners have been injured during the nerve war for nearly a year. The social conditions are vulnerable to disunity through claimed as issues of Ethnic, Religious, Race, and Intergroup (SARA). Even hoax news was scattered after each other coloring the face of the social media. Like a virus, the news of hoax continues to be continued to become news that is worried about its lies. No wonder if because of this, some people could become a person who is easy to berate children of their nation, even though most have never known the person who was abused. It could be argued that this begins with the rejection of Ahok and Jokowi who have always been linked as anti-Islam.

A series of peaceful actions were carried out by Muslims in Jakarta and some even came from various regions in Indonesia. Even in some of the follow-up actions, there was

momentum praying for AniesBaswedan to be the elected governor, because Anies is a Muslim. His expertise and intelligence are believed as the answer to the ummah's desire to have a leader who will fight for the interests of Islam and Muslims.

The existence of social media is also like a double-edged knife in a democracy that must be managed carefully. Initially, social media was revered in its role of developing democracy, but eventually, there was a lot of abuse to throw hoax to the public. False information that emerged during the campaign period in DKI Jakarta's elections has misled many people. Some people even including the figures often only interpret the election as an arena for power struggle and without any educational value to the wider community. At that time the virtual universe or netizens blazed. The different beliefs of incumbent candidates who helped advance awakened community groups. Especially from Muslim groups, began to respond and respond to the leadership issues originating from followers of minority religions in Indonesia. Muslim groups ranging from the traditional, moderate to hardline or fundamentalist, scrambling to give arguments so that it becomes a discourse, related to issues of leadership and good governance. Just like alumni activities 212 (the Islamic Defender Action) that claimed as the Muslim consolidation in increasing awareness of electing leaders, both regional heads, and in the legislature through elections or presidential elections through presidential elections to elect qualified Muslims to lead the republic, lead regions, and lead the DPR. The power of directing people is based on various factors. The figure who is always juxtaposed in these peaceful actions is Habib Rizieq Shihab who is claimed by the ummah as the High Priest (Imam Besar) of Muslimin. Many theories that reveal about these actions as the rise of Islamic populism.

There is something uncomfortable in translating political values in the arena of election contestation. Some people even including the figures often only interpret the election as an arena for power struggle and without any educational value to the wider community. With the spread of various social media as new media in the era of digital information, the tendency of individuals to get information becomes more "instant" than before. Even a lot of information about religious understanding that is connected with political issues becomes a paradox in itself, where individuals find it difficult to sort out objective information, and tend to be more biased. The battle produces views by referring to sacred texts that are dogmatic, mutually claiming to be "guardians" of religion and protectors of the people. To accuse the other candidates of not being as pure as himself. The difference in views has changed the succession of leadership from the political arena into an ideological struggle. Crowded with concepts such as jihad, haram, infidels, the benefit of the people and others. Until such conditions affect the psychological condition of the community in determining or electing government leaders.

On the contrary, the new governor couple must unite all components of Jakarta's society so that they can regroup to build the largest city in Indonesia, which is also full of various problems. Many problems require joint work to solve them such as social inequality, traffic jams, floods, crime, health, and others. As the Governor and the ranks of his government will not be able to solve it alone. Communities can be invited to work together to solve problems following their capacity. As elections are the most democratic means to represent the voice of the people. Voters as the owner of sovereignty always have a preference in making their choices. When choosing a leader not a religious leader, but a leader that overshadows all groups, all components, all elements, and diversity. So when someone chooses a leader, what should be the main benchmark is the work program, his ability to make his citizens happy, distributing a sense of justice to all citizens without looking at ethnic origins, religion or any partisan affiliations.

The real success of a leader is the ability in carrying out the promises of the program. The Indonesian experience too often been broken promises by politicians. What was said during the campaign period and when it was in power was reversed 180 degrees. Many leaders are in power not to serve the community, but there are dominant personal interests, to accumulate wealth, as a stepping stone for a higher political career or even for pride as people in power. The party and its support team also do not provide support for free. There is a cake of power that must be divided either in the form of economic projects, strategic positions, or political support for political contestation. This is a reality that must be faced. This is where leadership capacity is tested, how to balance these various competing interests, while still placing the interests of the people above other interests.

## **2. Method**

This study uses library research methods, namely a series of studies relating to library data collection methods, or research whose research objects are excavated through a variety of library information (books, encyclopedias, scientific journals, newspapers, magazines, and documents). Literature research is research that critically studies or reviews knowledge, ideas, or findings contained in various academic-oriented literature sources, and formulates theoretical and methodological contributions to a particular topic. The focus of library research is to find various theories, laws, propositions, principles, or ideas that are used to analyze and solve research questions that are formulated. The nature of this research is descriptive analysis, namely the regular elaboration of data that has been obtained, then given an understanding and explanation so that it can be well understood by the reader.

## **3. Result and Discussion**

### **a. Terminology of General Election**

Conceptually, IbnuTrichayono defined the election from an abstract and philosophical angle. He said that the general election is an instrument for realizing the sovereignty of the people, who intend to form a legitimate government to articulate the aspirations and interests of the people. Technically speaking, Andrew Reynolds stated that the election is a method to garner votes which translates into political seats in the parliament occupied by the elected party officials and the political candidates (Labolo, 2017, pp. 50-51). Thus the election system is not merely identified as technically counting votes in favor of determining the voters' choice for their leaders. But it also a form of dependency and interaction between all parties involved (Labolo, 2017, p. 56).

To see how voters, behave, three big theories explain why someone chooses a political party. Firstly, sociological theory. A person participates/does not participate in the election due to sociological issues, such as the similarity of religion, education, occupation, race, etc., this pattern of approach is better known as the Columbia School. Second, psychological theory, where a person's decision to choose or not is determined by closeness. According to this group, methodologically the sociological approach is considered difficult to measure, as well as measuring many indicators of social class, education level, religion and so on. Here the voters make their choices because of the influence of the psychological power that develops within them as a product of the socialization process, meaning that a person's attitude is a reflection of his personality and is a decisive variable in influencing his political behavior, this group is known as the Michigan Model. And the third is the rational choice approach (rational choice), this third model criticizes the two previous approaches. According to the rational choice approach, sociological characteristics, family background, cultural division, party identification through socialization processes, life experiences, are variables that individually influence one's political behavior. This means that other variables determine

or influence in influencing voter behavior. There are situational factors that influence one's political choices. That way voters are not only passive but also active, not only shackled by sociological characteristics but free to act. This situational factor can be political issues in the nominated candidate. The behavior of voters does not have to be fixed or the same, because the sociological characteristics and identification of parties can change with time and certain political events. In this way, political issues are an important consideration in which voters will make their choices based on an assessment of the political issues and candidates proposed (Leighley, 2010, pp. 239-261). And in this case, sociological and psychological factors are best related to the condition of the 2017 Jakarta governor contestation.

### **b. Islam as the Majority**

The Indonesian political system in the context cannot avoid influence from the Western political system. The reason is that first of all, Indonesia is former European colonies, such as the Netherlands, Britain, and Portugal. Then the second reason is due to the efforts in maintaining firmly to Westernized system through formal education from elementary to higher education. Additionally, concerning the economy, politics, and law, which led to Indonesia's dependency on the West regardless of the demographics of the Muslim majority and that Islam ideology was influential during the resistance against Western invasion (Rasyid, 2003, p. 11). In retrospect, frictions occurred at the time when the power of Islam began to propagate over the control of the colonialism. In the history of the struggle to expel invaders in Indonesia, the share of Islamic boarding school namely pesantren was not small. Started by prince SabrangLor (PatihUnus), Trenggono, Fatahillah (the era of the kingdom of Demak) who fought to expel the Portuguese (15th century). CikDitiro, Imam Bonjol, Hasanuddin, Prince Antasari, Prince Diponegoro and others until the revolutionary period of the year 1945. In the field of education, the role of Islamic boarding schools and madrassas in advancing and educating the nation and the people of Indonesia was enormous (Mubaraq, 2012, p. 7).

The magnitude role of religion in public life, as it turned out became fundamental to the power of kings of the past. Using simple technology, Kings of *Syailendra* was able to build temples, such as the Borobudur, Pawon, Mendut, Kalasa. Historical relics reflect the relationships between the role of religion, power, and composition of society in the Indonesian archipelago. The entry of Islam does not change the relationship of religion and power. Like previous kings, Islamic kingdoms that conformed to the teachings of Islam applied religion as the basis of royal power (Sanit, 2015, pp. 20-21). The 1955 election is also proof that the Islamic party has a very potential turnout when faced with the same issue (religion).

However, over time, making political parties that rely on ideology is no longer relevant. This is due to the increasing number of voters affected by various factors. New voters will certainly see the platform and vision and mission of political parties rather than sociological closeness (religion, ethnicity, race, etc.). Since the 15-19th century, complex legislation has played a role as an active tool in shaping historical process. At the same time, it recorded and enveloped the balances of social power and ideological forms of the struggle between social forces occurring during a certain time in history (Kusumah & Bolt, 1998, p. 6).

However, life always changes along with a dynamic society. Islam is still the majority religion in Indonesia. Adherents are about 90% of the total population of Indonesia. With the majority, it is appropriate for the distribution of political aspirations to follow Islamic values and struggles. The existence of Islamic political parties is considered as an aspiration of the organization of Islamic struggle. Thus, the establishment of Islamic political parties is an inevitable necessity. Sociologically, the majority of Muslims in Indonesia are obedient, and

they will feel comfortable and safe when the distribution of their political aspirations through Islamic political parties. This sociological context seems to be used by the Islamic political elite to establish Islamic political parties. The majority of Muslims will get support from Muslims. The existence of Islamic political parties will automatically be supported by Muslims. Moreover, coupled with theological perspectives, where the need for means of struggle to realize the aspirations of Islam so that sociological and theological factors meet to complement and support each other. Proponents of Islamic formalism drive the DKI elections to political consolidation. The victory in the DKI regional election catapulted political Islam actors to the public stage. Islamic political sentiment strengthened. The DKI Regional Election Model will be submitted to other political events on a broader scale.

### **c. Islamic Populism Movement at Jakarta**

The accreditation of religion by middle-class Muslims has changed in an increasingly interesting model to be observed. The return of religion during Indonesian society which has been globalized by the culture of hedonism and rationalism has only added to the pious impression of the religious community during industrial technology. To correct society and restore it to the true path, individuals must be persuaded to return to Islam. This is due to their views on merely carrying out rituals of worship as a form of relationship with Allah SWT. The return of religion to the new trends of modern humans has dismissed the general assumption or at least has rejected the thesis about the death of his Lord Nietzsche. On the contrary, when we refer to the practices in the lives of Prophet Muhammad PBUH and his Companions, many of their actions and political acts are reflected in today's world. This means that politics in Islam is grounded on references in terms of teaching and does not originate from outside Islam.

According to the results of the PPIM survey (Center for Islamic and Community Studies) as quoted by Jamhari (2003) Indonesian Muslims state that religion (70%) is always taken into consideration whenever making decisions on social and political issues. Thus, anthropologically and sociologically, the chaotic atmosphere of social life up to the sharp moral crisis of religion (still) becomes the foundation for the future of humanity. Furthermore, Garadian (2017) noted that the Islamic populism movement which has been purely transformed into a new model by a populist group joined in an alliance between classes to gain power. Thus, the Islamic populism movement has become a mere frame that lies under the interests of the will to power. And the 212 actions before the 2019 Presidential Election constitute historical romanticism. The issue of Islamic populism found its momentum in the phenomenon of Ahok and the elections in 2017, although Ahok has been imprisoned the Islamic Defender Action continues, the aim is to subvert Jokowi's "regime" which has been seen as not pro-Muslim. Even the ideas and steps taken in winning Anies as Jakarta's governor are said to be the influence of the power of the Salafi propaganda which is now trending among the Muslims of the urban Jakarta. The Salafi movement has demonstrated an extraordinary ability to adapt to changing political conditions in Indonesia, especially Jakarta. This flexibility challenges the view of Salafism which is accepted as a religious current centered on rigid theology. Information progress and infrastructure improvement are the main actors that significantly influence voter turnout. Islamic ideology becomes relevant as a political barter tool to hook the voice of the people.

For urban Muslims, Islam represents various 'sacred canopies' which nourish common bonds and piety and impose moral injunctions on cosmological and daily activities. As they have previously accustomed to seeing how Muslim societies strive to overcome increasingly secular world conditions (personal, forthcoming). However, the religiosity that arises among urban Muslims is often built on discontent. These urban middle-class Muslims who are

economically established, actually face problems in the socio-cultural aspects of their identity. There is a feeling of insecurity as their lives have become more individualistic. They continue to pursue, claim, and promote their understanding of religion and Islamic identity, which tend to be exclusive and reluctant to accept differences. And rapid social transformation marked by industrialization, urbanization, and modernization can result in dislocation and disappointment among certain segments of society, such as young people, petty bourgeoisie, and middle-class members who are frustrated by the lack of social mobility, and they are always ready to protest (Ismail, 2006, pp. 11-13). In short, their socioeconomic status has improved but their welfare is threatened. Fearing the loss of their identity, these newly born Muslims have made religion the basis of their communal experience. For them, religion offers a sense of security in the world and the hereafter. In the history of Jakarta itself, Islam is always associated as part of Jakarta's diversity. Betawi must be Islam's concept as a native of Jakarta also influenced the culture of Jakarta society in general. Furthermore, one that accelerates such phenomena is the understanding of the Salafi dakwah which currently preferred by urban communities.

#### **d. The Notion of Salafism**

Salafi concepts and differences about how to understand Islam have long grown in Indonesia. Initially, it began in the mid of 1980s. It's just that it found its momentum after the occurrence of freedom in Indonesian democracy in 1998. Before 1998, the New Order government always tried to consolidate their power through the idea that empowered communities needed to create socially and homogeneous political citizens. However, in the post-New Order era, people were not merely passive recipients of state policies. The efforts of the state in the homogenization of the community have helped to arouse people's struggles with identity politics, especially in terms of an increasingly strengthening Islamic identity politics. They called their movement as Dakwah Salafi; that is to call Muslims to understand and practice Islam according to the right doctrine, i.e. Islam like that was practiced and understood by Salaf al-Salih. The Salafi was primarily a pietist and apolitical movement that did not pose a threat to the government. As the pietist movement Salafi concerned with social changes through modifying individuals. Politics in the views of ordinary predominant Muslims are separated from the teachings of Islam just like the secular who separated the nation and the daily life from the religion. Thus most of the views of ordinary Muslims (Rasyid, 2003, p. 11) The second type of Salafism is the "*haraki*" (from Arabic *haraka*, 'movement'), also called "politicos" by some scholars. Unlike the "purists" who maintain unconditional obedience to the ruler, the "*haraki*" object to total submission to the government. They believe that Islam is an all-encompassing worldview that covers all aspects of life, including rituals, social norms, economics, and politics. Consequently, a ruler must implement Islamic norms and regulations and thus he has to submit to and enact Islamic laws. Failure to implement Islamic law results in criticism by the ruled.

Salafiyah itself, derived from the word *Salaf* and linguistic standpoint means 'which have passed/preceded.' It is attributed to "*As-Salaf as-Saalih*," - the first three generations of Muslims. They are companions (*al-sahabah*) of the Prophet Peace Be Upon Him (PBUH) and their *imams* (leaders) consisting of successors (*al-Tabi'in*) and the successors of the successors (*atba' al-Tabi'in*). The word *Salaf* also means: someone who has preceded the (earlier) in the science, faith, virtue, and goodness. Ibn Manzhur Rahimahullah said, "The *Salaf* also means the people who preceded you, both the nearest and the closest (companions), who are generally older and prime. This is because the first generations came from the *Tabi'in* and referred to as "*As Salafush Saalih*" (Jawas, 2009, p. 14). Al-Baijuri also said that "The meaning of the forerunners (*Salaf*) were those previous people from among the Prophets, the Companions, *Tabi'in*, and their followers." (Jawas, 2009, p. 16)

*Salafiyyah* is a methodology (*manhaj*) concerning *deen* (religion or way of life) that is understood and practiced by those pious predecessors, who adhered strictly to the importance of the Qur'an, Sunnah, and the ways/teachings of the *Salaf*. Unlike other Muslims, the *salafis* (the *salaf*) firmly refuse to practice based on culture, customs nor traditions of the local Muslim community. The term "Salafi" derives from *salaf* (predecessors) and refers in this case specifically to the first three generations of the Muslim community (*al-salaf al-salih*). A Salafi is then defined as a person who follows the *manhaj* (path) of the *salaf*. The doctrine of Salafism can be traced back to an earlier period, to the teachings of Ibn Taymiyya and Ahmad ibn Hanbal. In the contemporary period, Abdul Aziz Abdullah ibn Baz and Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani are among the most influential Salafi authors.

In Indonesia, this set of beliefs has long been presented in the Muslim community along with the *dakwah* evolution of Muhammad bin Abd Wahab in the Saudi Arabian Peninsula, who received support from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia under the dynasty *ĀluSa'ūd*. Principal teachings of Shaykh Muhammad were to revert the understanding of Muslims to the days of *SalafusShālih*, emphasizing creed on *Tawheed* (Unity of God) and *Aqeedah* (Matters of Faith). His *dakwah* on *Tawheed* aimed to cleanse the beliefs of Muslims against various ailments against *Aqeedah* such as *shirk* (accepting other gods and divinities alongside Allah), *khurafat* (superstition), *takhayyul* (linking something seen or heard to be bad luck); whereas from the aspects of worshiping, the purpose was to safeguard against the impurities of *bid'ah* (innovation in religious matters), which was unfounded in the era during the above mentioned early three generations. Since this ideology grew and evolved in the regions of Hijaz and Najed, so it flourished rapidly among the entire Islamic world, as each year Muslims make pilgrimages to those two cities of Mecca and Medina, as well as, scholars in pursuit of learning and knowledge.

However, the *da'wah* of Shaikh Muhammad tends to object interfering with the affairs of Islamic political power. *Salafi's* followers including those in Indonesia, maintain distance from the teachings of the Shaikh Muhammad bin Abd Wahab. They are uninterested to discuss socio-political issues, about government, law nor the economy. Moreover, their attitude towards giving votes in the elections required a *fatwa* or statement expressing legal opinion issued by the *ulamas* in Saudi Arabia to determine whether or not to participate.

Inconsequent Salafi's teaching also became influential to many organizations whose tenets and principles are based on Islam, including Muhammadiyah, Persatuan Islam (Persis), al-Irsyad. Renowned figures from those organizations also have similar traits of characteristics to those of the Indonesian National Revolution, therefore making the *dakwah* more prominent since the days of the colonial Dutch. What is phenomenal is the existence of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), PKS is a party that trades the Puritan Islamic movement. The PKS movement has more in common with the global movement influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (Damanik, 2002, p. 26). Extraordinary political openness in Indonesia has pushed Salafi groups into everyday politics. Furthermore, Salafi groups are becoming more inclined to adopt pragmatic and practical discourse. The Salafi movement has demonstrated an extraordinary ability to adapt to changing political conditions in Indonesia, especially Jakarta. This flexibility challenges the view of Salafism which is accepted as a religious current centered on rigid theology.

In his book, "*Ad-Da'wat al Islamiyyat*," Achmad Ghalwash defines *dakwah* as a knowledge that can contribute to a range of efforts towards motivations in the teachings of Islam, from *Aqeedah*, *Sharia*, and *Akhlaq* (personal disposition) (Faizah & Effendi, 2006, pp. 5-6). Within the Islamic community, *dakwah* means a calling to the right path towards the truth, towards God and not the devils. It would not be called a *Dakwah*, had the appeal was

not intended to usher mankind into God's path. In this context, Sayyid Quthub reiterated: "Verily, *dakwah* is a calling on to the way of God and not the *dakwah* that is carried out without performing duties and obligations to Allah the Almighty." (Ismail, 2006, p. 129) In the process of *dakwah*, a classification of *mad'u*, which refers to the receivers of *dakwah*, is compiled concerning the characteristics of each *mad'u* to select the appropriate method. *Dakwah's* method is dynamic and contextual suited for the targeted audience. There is no absolute method nor approach to *dakwah*. External factors greatly influence the strength in selecting a method that is beyond the scope of the method alone, including the readiness of prepared materials to be presented, as well as, the conditions of the *mad'u* and a method used in carrying out the *Dakwah* (Ismail, 2006, pp. 199-200).

#### **e. Identity Politics in Islamic Populism Movement in the DKI Jakarta Election**

Political choices and reasons that arise are influenced by variables that have occurred in recent years, one of which is the strengthening of the issue of political Islam, both among the general public and the academic world in particular. Especially the increase in religious awareness followed by political awareness of Muslims. At present, groups based on communal religious identity have gathered strength and presented socio-political challenges in national and local politics, especially in elections, economic and community development, religious affairs, and education, both through their strengths and also especially when they are mobilized en masse, as seen from the strengthening of Islamic populism. However, proponents of Islamic populism in Indonesia are generally peaceful, in the sense that they do not strive to turn Indonesia into an open battlefield between Muslims and non-Muslims, or between fellow Muslims but who differ in religious sects and expressions.

Then what is Islamic populism? Populism is an elusive concept, not easy to explain, which is often interpreted differently by social scientists, especially when comparing the concepts of populism in the 19th and 21st centuries today. Here, populism is defined as a series of political discourses and strategies aimed at breaking up the institutional system by polarizing society into two hostile camps. In the context of Islam in Indonesia, both camps can be represented as traditionalist-moderate and modernist-conservative groups. In social movements, actors must be able to frame their planned actions in language and slogans that are easily understood to touch their sentiments. This is the art of communication to convey a message to the audience so that their participation and loyalty are supported by ideology as the effectiveness of a framing.

As an asymmetric multiclass alliance by utilizing the people's discontent, it is very problematic. Because the term "class" itself is understood not merely as an individual aggregate as a social group that has a history and place in the Islamic community, but as an aggregate of individuals who are equalized based on differences in income, level of education, and ownership of the means of production. Without reference to these differences, between poor and rich, multi-class alliances in the name of the *ummah* contain internal contradictions. Different interests will clash - to some extent negate each other.

The homogenization of Islam in Islamic populism does not occur through the people, but rather the *ummah*. In Islamic populism, the concept of "*Ummah*" is used instead of the concept of the people. Although the *ummah* is often understood in a supranational framework, along with the emergence of the Islamic movement through real struggle encourages the development of a more rational understanding. Such understanding is needed to bridge diverse and conflicting social interests. The division of these two groups does not automatically ignore the existence of various other Islamic groups, such as traditionalist-conservative or modernist-moderate groups and others who increasingly emphasize popular political polarization in the context of Islam in Indonesia. The heterogeneity of Jakarta people

contributed greatly to the success of the series of peaceful actions. And again the power of social media as a campaign tool is so effective that it makes not only the governor to be elected but also how to show Islam is.

SyafiiMa'arif is alarmed about the emergence of what he calls the "Political Identity". According to him, political identity-based movements endanger Indonesia's future due to its anti-pluralism tendency, anti-democracy, and anti-nationalism. Historically, political identity in this country can be signified with ethnicity, religion and political ideologies. He believes that a cautious consideration is the issue of the radicalism and half-radical groups who are synonymous with wearing clothes inspired and influenced by the movements of Islamists and Salafis, as they were initially centered in several Arab countries. Even though it is a type of outfit uniform, all Islamic and Salafi movements both demand the implementation of Islamic Sharia in state life. Besides treats and endangerment according to Syafi'i, demanding the implementation of Islamic Sharia is a difficult proposition due to its ahistorical nature. The supporters failed to accept the idea nor did they even want to live together with the changing times (Shafi'i, 2010, p. 50).

Islamic populism is an asymmetric multiclass alliance that identifies itself as the *ummah* vis-a-vis elite in response to social contradictions in the construction of contemporary capitalism. Islamic populism also mobilizes and homogenizes various dissatisfied "masses" who are very different from certain "elites". The emergence of Islamic populism is inseparable from the legacy of social conflict in the Cold War era which plagued the Islamic political and social movements. Material factors are seen as influencing the formation of social relations and political Islam strategy. The result was an outcome of Islamic populism in the three countries. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood (IM) succeeded in mastering the realm of the Civil Society for a long time. When Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak collapsed, the IM became a consolidated political force by temporarily controlling the country. Likewise, with the case of Turkey, the evolution of Islamic populism led to the victory of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Whereas in Indonesia, historically, Islamic populism failed to dominate the state and civil society, both when using non-electoral strategies in the case of Darul Islam/the Indonesian Islamic Army (DII/TII), and the electoral case of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS).

For Indonesia, populism is not new. Since the colonial era, the Dutch East Indies had emerged a populist movement in opposing the colonial elite for the development of the nation. Until post-Independence, during the Old Order, populism took place in an anti-colonial-elite discourse to be anti-imperial elite. In the early days of the New Order-Soeharto era, a discourse emerged on building Indonesian socialism and continuing the ideals of the revolution that was not yet finished. Although in the end, the process of depoliticization and de-ideology in the context of severing relations between the political elite and the masses of the people (the party) had dimmed populism until the end of the New Order's rule.

The establishment of Islamic political parties in the reform era in Indonesia after the fall of Suharto (1998), considered as a resurgence of a political stream. The changing behavior of voters of Islamic political parties in the history of Indonesia's political configuration. Several factors led to the revival of Islamic parties after the New Order, the theological factor, historical, sociological, and reform factor. The presence of Islamic political parties after the New Order was diverse and fragmented. In the political elite of Islam itself in establishing a political party based on Islam and also based on nationality. And in establishing political party substantially and formalistic approach was being used. In the reform era elections, political Islam has failed, in which Islamic parties do not receive optimal support from voters Islam. The failure of Islamic parties in the election of the reform

era is caused by factor among Muslims has been changing the orientation of political views. Islamic parties in the reform era stuck in a political myth quantity, and Islamic parties are also fragmented and fractured into small forces. Also doing the same thing by opening up opportunities for popular screen leaders to become vote-getters for political parties. Found a special pattern and its model of Indonesian Salafi which can be very different from global Salafism.

Again in Indonesia, Islamic populism is an urban phenomenon. The rise of the vocal urban Muslim middle class in Indonesia cannot be separated from the position of urban-modernist Muslims who were previously marginalized in the country during the New Order, which encouraged these groups to build and maintain the emergence of new Islamic populism (Private, forthcoming). In general, contemporary urban Muslims are constantly looking for a world that is religiously defined and provides moral order and spiritual protection for humans. According to Peter Berger, in this materialistic world, religion, or the religious worldview, is the 'sacred canopy' (Berger, 1967).

Proponents of Islamic populism in Indonesia are generally peaceful, in the sense that they do not strive to turn Indonesia into an open battlefield between Muslims and non-Muslims, or between fellow Muslims but who differ in religious sects and expressions. However, they often show intolerance in the way they debate, promote and spread their perspectives on Islam and are very critical of Muslims and non-Muslims who do not share the same views. These intolerant actions often eventually lead to socio-religious tensions (personal, forthcoming).

Islamic mass organizations such as Nahdatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah, Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), Hizbut-Tahrir Indonesia do not seem capable enough to make themselves like IM in Egypt. The fragmentation of Muslims in Indonesia at both the issue and organizational levels is one of their failure factors in controlling the arena of civil society. Pressure on Islam, in addition to suppressing other progressive forces, during the New Order brought the power of Islam to the margins. The establishment of the United Development Party (PPP) as an Islamic electoral vehicle does not necessarily smooth the agenda of the people. There are many factors shown by VediHadiz in this book such as the struggle for the material resources of the oligarchic elite during the New Order era. After the Reformation, electoral vehicles began to emerge and people had a variety of choices. There are at least three Islamic parties that can survive, namely the National Awakening Party (PKB), the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), and the United Development Party (PPP). As Hadiz explained, that Islamic populism in its new form has broader and more diverse social bases, while simultaneously being able to fight freely through the electoral path. Because of the emphasis on the material base as a determining factor for the success of Islamic politics in Indonesia. Then the failure of Islamic politics through the electoral channel was also caused by the absence of the dominant Muslim bourgeoisie.

The success of Anies becoming governor of Jakarta, as the capital of the Republic of Indonesia, did not lead the Salafis and also other Muslim groups satisfied and give in. They will be ready to oversee and counterbalance Anies to become a governor who is following the principles of the Islamic religion, namely a good leader who emulates the leadership of the Prophet Muhammad PBUH.

#### 4. Conclusion

From the analysis of the discussion above, the authors can conclude the following results:

First; With the existence of Muslims as the majority, the distribution of political aspirations follows Islamic values and struggles, and the existence of Islamic political parties is considered as the aspirations of Islamic struggle organizations. In a sociological and theological context, the community needs an Islamic party to channel their aspirations, so that this motive is utilized as well as possible by the political elite, including in the aspect of winning the election of DKI Jakarta.

Second; The Islamic populism movement that had been purely transformed into a new model by populist groups joined in an alliance between classes to gain power. Thus, the Islamic populism movement has become a mere frame which lies under the interests of the desire to rule. So then, the 212 movement was considered a romanticism of action before it finally became an arena of identity politics in the 2019 Presidential Election.

Third; The extraordinary political openness in Indonesia has pushed Salafi groups to become directly involved in politics. Salafi groups are becoming more inclined to adopt pragmatic and practical discourse. The Salafi movement has demonstrated an extraordinary ability to adapt to changing political conditions in Indonesia, particularly in the DKI Jakarta elections. This flexibility challenges the view of Salafism which is accepted as a religious current centered on rigid theology.

Forth; Islamic populism in its new form has a broader and more diverse social base, while simultaneously being able to fight freely through the electoral path. Their active involvement in political contestation resulted in Anies becoming the governor of DKI Jakarta. After that, they will always supervise and balance the elected governor to follow the principles of the Islamic religion, namely a good leader who imitates the leadership of the Prophet Muhammad.

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