

## Kim Jong-Un's Aims in Negotiating with Trump: Strategic or Tactical Flexibility?

Morteza Nourmohammadi<sup>1</sup>, Ellias Aghili Dehnavi<sup>2</sup>, Mohammad Alizadehjamal<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1,2,3</sup>Allameh Tabataba'i University, Iran

<sup>1</sup>mnourmohammadi@atu.ac.ir, <sup>2</sup>elyasaghili@gmail.com, <sup>3</sup>M\_alizadeh97@atu.ac.ir

### Abstract

*Washington has tried to persuade Pyongyang to disarm nuclear weapons with various measures and instruments. This situation led to a crisis of relations between the two countries after Trump's victory in the election of the United States in 2016 and the rise of threatening verbal actions by the leaders of the two countries and numerous nuclear and missile tests by Pyongyang, to the extent that war could occur at any moment in the Korean Peninsula. But the United States and North Korea's oral agreement in March 2018 for meeting and negotiating between two countries surprised everyone. In such a situation, the question which will be asked is that whether Pyongyang's action is a tactical action aimed at reducing economic problems, or does Kim Jong-Un has decided to leave his nuclear program in exchange for financial, economic, and security assurances? The research findings indicates that North Korea is pursuing nuclear weapons because of confronting structural and regional developments that altered balance of power in the Korean peninsula. In other words, given North Korea's deteriorated strategic environment and intensifying insecurity, nuclearization is not a rational option, but nuclear weapons are effective and efficient means to ensure North Korea's security and survival. Kim Jong-un desire for negotiation is a tactical move to reduce economic, international and regional pressures to enhance nuclear capabilities and strengthen bargaining power in the future.*

**Keywords:** Trump, Kim Jong-Un, nuclear crisis, strategic environment, regional developments

### 1. Introduction

Since the 1990s, concerns over the North Korean nuclear program have become a central issue in US-North Korean relationships, and the relationships between the two countries which are affected by Pyongyang's nuclear activities have been faced various ups and downs. Washington has tried to persuade Pyongyang to disarm nuclear weapons with various measures such as bilateral and multilateral talks, economic sanctions, military threats, and the strengthening of its military presence in the region. But Pyongyang has refused to abandon its nuclear activities.

Although the two countries have reached agreements in some cases, and relationships between the two countries have been in a short period of relative tranquility, but this situation has not been stable. The crisis in the two countries relations has resumed after Trump's victory in the 2016 presidential election. To the extent that war could occur at any moment in the Korean Peninsula because of escalating war of words between leaders of the two countries and the numerous nuclear and missile tests by Pyongyang. Trump cited Kim a "Rocket Man" on a "suicide mission" and Kim called Trump as a "mentally deranged U.S. dotard" threatened "to turn Washington into a sea of fire" (Sang-Hun, 2017).

But the United States and North Korea's agreement in March 2018 for meeting and negotiating surprised everyone. Most surprisingly, North Korea and the United States accept these negotiations without any preconditions, and both sides are optimistic about reaching an agreement. Trump and Kim held a meeting in Singapore in June 2018. They signed a joint statement that committed North Korea to "work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" and committed joint efforts to "build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula" (Landler, 2018).

The debatable advancement of US-North Korean negotiations and worrying signs of activity from North Korea's nuclear complex suggest that Pyongyang has no plans to give up its nuclear

activities. In such a situation, the question which will be asked is that whether Pyongyang's action is a tactical action aimed at reducing economic problems, or whether Kim Jong-Un has decided to leave his nuclear program in exchange for financial, economic, and security assurances?

The article finds that The research findings indicates that North Korea is pursuing nuclear weapons because of confronting structural and regional developments that altered balance of power in the Korean peninsula. In other words, given North Korea's deteriorated strategic environment and intensifying insecurity, nuclearization is not a rational option, but nuclear weapons are effective and efficient means to ensure North Korea's security and survival. Kim Jong-un desire for negotiation is a tactical move to reduce economic, international and regional pressures to enhance nuclear capabilities and strengthen bargaining power in the future.

The rest of the article is organized as follows. The first section describes the data. The second section explores the background of prior research in this area and develops the possible independent variables. The third and fourth sections examine the statistical models employed as well as the results, and the fifth section discusses and concludes

### **Deteriorated strategic environment and intensifying insecurity**

Perhaps the most important questions are those like why Pyongyang's insistence on improving military capabilities, especially nuclear and missile capabilities. The answer to this question is in the requirements of the strategic environment which the North Korean political system operates. This strategic environment can be reviewed at both internal and external levels. At the internal level, the most important factor is the nature of the political system and the state. The North Korean political system can be regarded as a totalitarian system (tyranny system) with regard to the six components of absolute dictatorship, ideal and utopian ideology, widespread and universal violence, the monopoly of coercion and violence, the centralized and planned economy, and the monopoly of mass media (McEachern,2018: 3).

The main element of the regime is the military. Unlike the former communist regimes which were based on two components of government and the party, the North Korean regime is based on three components of the party, military and government (Scobell, 2006: 6). Kim Jong-Un power is more based on military power and because of this issue Pyongyang follows the military priority policy over other sectors. Many political slogans are being promoted to induce a major role in the military. One of these slogans is "Great Nation with Strong Army." Along with saber rattling, Kim Jong-Un has tried to destroy North Korea's most famous and powerful characters in a variety of ways. Jang Song-thaek (a high-ranking politician of North Korea and Kim Jong-un's Aunt's husband), Jeong Yeong-Jin (former North Korean ambassador to Cuba), Jang Young-chul (Jang Song-thaek's nephew and former North Korean ambassador to Malaysia), Hyon Yong-chol ( former Secretary of Defense) and Ri Yong-gil (The General Staff Department (GSD) of the Korean People's Army) have been among the most prominent political and military officials that have so far been subjected to wrath by young North Korean leaders under various pretexts (Fingar, 2017: 5).

Another variable is the economic crisis and the fear of emerging social crises through economic sanctions. For this reason, North Korean officials have taken a series of measures to overcome the crisis. Traditional and usual measures such as encouraging workers to increase production, encouraging people to save energy, uniting people around the party, and increasing their tolerance through political education, and formulating the theory of a lasting social political unities (based on this theory, the people, the leader and the party are integrated into a unity and people must unconditionally follow a leadership, because leadership is the core of this unity), until reforms in the agricultural, industrial and commercial sectors (such as the first joint investment law in 1984, the creation of an area of free trade which its name is Rajin Sonbong and the drafting of supportive laws and the reduction of the members number of labor teams from 10 to 25 into 7 to 8), and the removal of the dictatorship of the proletariat from the constitution law in 1992, and replacing it with the term democratic dictatorship (Kang, 2011:150-154).

At the foreign level, the insecure security environment and the patterns of hostility engagement between regional and trans-regional actors have made Pyongyang feel an inescapable need to reach and maintain nuclear and missile capabilities. Among the conterminous countries, Pyongyang

defines South Korea as its great enemy. This sense of hostility stems from past experiences and the communist thoughts which are dominant in North Korea (Cheng, 2013:25). South Korea has also been opposed to the military attack and the collapse of the ruling regime in North Korea due to its concern about the disorder (such as the homeless crisis), economic vulnerability and changes in regional equilibrium; South Korea also has sought to expand economic cooperation with North Korea and create dependency and leverage in order to support international action to put pressure on Pyongyang (Hughes, 2007: 80). Japan, on one hand, is cooperating with the United States and South Korea to confront the threats posed by North Korea's nuclear program, but on the other hand, Japan is opposed to the military option due to the economic vulnerability, infestation of refugees and Korean homeless persons to this country, the escalation of militarization in the region, the security of the region and avoid pursuing economic development policy, ambiguity about how to end the war and the future role of Japan in the region, the fear of increasing China's strength and strengthening of Russia's presence in the region (Nakato, 2013: 51-53). At the level of the international system, North Korean leaders consider the United States as an existential threat to the security and survival of their government (Huntley, 2007: 458).

The US foreign policy in the region is influenced by the changing dynamics of domestic politics, regional and global interests, and regional actors. After trying a hydrogen bomb test, in a bulletin was read out because of this event in the North Korean government television: As long as the United States does not completely abandon its hostile policy about North Korea, there will be neither suspending in the development of nuclear weapons, nor doing any action towards nuclear disarmament, even if the sky falls (Cho, 2017: 8). Also, North Korea does not trust its neighbors, such as China and Russia, because, in spite of receiving some support and assistance from the two countries, they have been reluctant to confront pressures or even decrease their effects on Pyongyang. Under such conditions that the North Korean government only consider themselves alone and against external enemies and also do not trust their former friends, it is usual for them to think about helping themselves and try to survive and achieve more destructive weapons. In fact, from this perspective, the testing of a hydrogen bomb and a ballistic missile was conducted by Pyongyang with the aim of deterrence (Hymans, 2008: 261) "The North Korea, as a responsible nuclear state, will not be the first to use a nuclear weapon, and as long as the enemy forces do not violate its sovereignty and also will not provide any nuclear weapons and technology for others under any circumstances," declared the North Korean television after a hydrogen bomb test (Cho, 2017: 10). This reflects a deterrence position in North Korean government thinking in general and its recent action in the testing of hydrogen bombs and long-range ballistic missiles.

Foreign ministry spokesman in his statement declared that "all proposals for maintaining peace and stability in the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia, including suggestions to stop our nuclear tests and the conclusion of a peace treaty in exchange for the termination of joint US military exercises are valid " (Cho, 2017: 13). His statement confirms that the North Korean government considers threats in terms of its survival and security from the United States and its allies in the region, which considering these have an important role in the actions and behaviors of this country. China's positions against North Korea are also based on security considerations: First, with the rise of North Korea's escalating behavior, the presence of the United States in East Asia will be strengthened; on the pretext of counteracting its actions; this is not in line with Beijing's interests, considering Washington's policies to curb China (Delury, 2012: 70). Also, South Korea and Japan, as the two main US allies and the two major rivals of China in East Asia, will strengthen their defense and military capabilities under the pretext of North Korea's threat. This leads to the feeling of insecurity in Beijing, which ultimately leads to the formation and escalation of the mystery of security and the rise of military and arms rivalries, a matter which the Chinese have made great efforts to avoid and to pursue their peaceful growth (Sobol, 2018: 4). In other words, an increase in military rivalries could lead to an increase in the country's military spending and also could slow down its economic growth. Moreover, the lack of continuous communication between the elites of Beijing and Pyongyang, and the difficulties of reading the minds and intentions of the Korean authorities has led to unpredictable North Korean government behavior and reduced trust between the two countries (Mastro, 2018: 94-95).

## 2. Historical Approach to US-North Korean negotiations

The US-North Korean negotiations about conflicting interests, especially nuclear activities, raises a question which is: What will be the fate of these negotiations? Will they reach a strategic and lasting agreement on divergent issues and the expansion of relations in different areas? Or Will Kim Jong-Un, like Muammar Gaddafi, accepts the removal of nuclear facilities in exchange for receiving economic assistance and the existence of the political system from the United States? Answering these questions requires a historical process of relations between the two countries since the 1950s, an understanding of the structures of political and economic power in North Korea, regional dynamics and structural components affecting the relations between these countries. At first glance, it is very clear that the possibility of reaching an agreement on the meeting of the two leaders is very difficult and perhaps impossible, since international agreements are based on some issues especially like negotiation and agreement at the level of experts and diplomats, but these issues are foggy in the relations of these countries. Moreover, the investigation of the historical trends of the relations between two countries since 1950 shows that numerous negotiations and agreements have been taken place between the two countries. There was no diplomatic relationship between North Korea and the United States since the Korean War in the 1950s until the late 1980s. In the final years of the Cold War, the Reagan administration, believing that North Korea's growing isolation would be a destabilizing factor in the North-East Asian region, allowed the foreign ministry to negotiate with the North Korean authorities and ended the general prohibition of commercial and financial transactions with Pyongyang. On March 11, 1993, following a request of the IAEA in order to inspect North Korea's nuclear facilities without time and location restrictions, Pyongyang warned that he would withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, but Clinton administration had no choice but to negotiate with Pyongyang and this four months negotiation process led to an agreement between the two countries, known as the "Agreed Framework". According to this agreement, the United States committed to help North Korea in constructing two light water reactors in exchange for Pyongyang's commitment to peaceful use of nuclear energy, provide 500 thousand tons of oil per year for North Korea and also not to use nuclear weapons against North Korea (Kim, 2011: 71). From this time on, North Korea took on the process of multilateral negotiations which leads to six-party negotiations. In these negotiations, North Korea agreed to cease its nuclear activities in exchange for some concessions, including the establishment of the Korea Peninsula Energy Development Organization and the construction of a light water reactor. This situation continued until 1998. North Korea limited its cooperation with Washington and reopened its nuclear and missile activities in response to a lack of concessions from the United States. Clinton's goal at this time was to maintain the status quo in order to prepare situations for North Korea to escape from political, economic, and cultural isolation, and this country is becoming more tangibly engaged in international politics (Haggard & Noland: 2010: 541).

North Korea tested its missile Taepodong-I after not receiving any concessions from the United States, to maintain its initiative action, and announced that this country will test Taepodong-II missile soon. The result of this action was the presence of the United States at the negotiating table in 2000. In these negotiations, Albright was represented as a US ambassador and asked North Korea to abandon the Taepodong-II missile test in exchange for financial, medical, and food aid from the US. After the September 11th events and North Korea's inclusion in the list of Bush's Axis of Evil, Pyongyang officials dismantled all devices and cameras of the IAEA and threatened to leave the NPT (Michishita, 2009: 105). Foreign Minister of United State, Colin Powell, announced in a speech on 10<sup>th</sup> June 2002 that the United States will enter into negotiations with Korea if they do the following practical steps:

- Stop producing all massacre weapons
- Ending missile programs
- Government reforms and efforts to improve people's quality of life
- Not using humanitarian aid in military affairs (Cha, 2000: 271-273).

Following this policy, Pyongyang announced in October 2002 that he has a secret program for the enrichment and that the United States stopped supplying fuel to this country. In response to

Washington's action, Pyongyang has officially announced his withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), in addition to banning the use of the US dollar.

The process of the tripartite and six-party negotiations led to the September 19, 2005 agreement that in exchange for the cessation of North Korea's nuclear activities, the United States committed to abandoning its previous threats to overthrow Kim Jong-un's state and to refrain from including North Korea's name on the axis of evil list and normalized its relations with Pyongyang; however, the US Treasury's sudden action in ceasing and blocking banking operations in Delta Asia bank in Asia has led North Korea to abandon the negotiations, and launch a nuclear test on October 9, 2006 (Snyder, 2007: 66-67).

Pyongyang's motivations from the nuclear test were ensuring the security of the regime, attempting to engage the United States in bilateral negotiations and satisfying the extreme elements in the Pyongyang's regime and also, he had technical motivations (Avery and saqassoni, 2006: 3-5).

After resolving of United Nations Security Council 1718 resolution and increasing pressure on North Korea by the regional powers, Pyongyang agreed to return to the negotiating table, and the six-party process of negotiating eventually led to an agreement between the two countries on February 13, 2007, accordingly, North Korea will receive financial and technical assistance in exchange for abandoning of its nuclear program and will be excluded from economic and financial sanctions. The United State also committed to normalizing its relationship with Pyongyang and providing security guarantees. In the next round of the six-party negotiations, a "Second Action Plan" was agreed whereby North Korea was required to provide a complete report on its nuclear activities by the end of December 2007 (Glaser & Liang, 2008: 173-174).

After the Bush administration's announcement to remove this country from the list of supporters of terrorism and canceling some energy sanctions, North Korea was attempting to destroy the cooling tower in the Yongbyon complex. In 2009, North Korea launched a rocket into space, dismissed IAEA inspectors and proceeded to nuclear testing. By resolving the 1874 resolution from Security Council, North Korea announced that they will resume uranium enrichment and will not return to the six-party negotiations. With the death of Kim Jong Il in December 2011, negotiations were held between the United States and North Korea that, as a result, North Korea announced that, in exchange for receiving food aid from the United States, they will postpone nuclear testing, uranium enrichment, and long-range missile testing. But launching a satellite carrier rocket into space on 12<sup>th</sup> April 2012 broke the deal. The repeating action of North Korea in launching satellite carrier rocket has led to resolving Security Council 2087 resolution on January 22, 2013. On February 12, 2013, North Korea launched its third nuclear test. On March 7, 2013, the Security Council, in addition to condemning this action, imposed new sanctions on North Korea in its 2094 resolution (Shin and Moon, 2018:35).

In January 2016, North Korea announced its acquisition of a hydrogen bomb in its fourth nuclear test, and in September 2016 Pyongyang recorded its fifth nuclear test. In 2017, with the testing of two continental rockets, the North Korean leader announced that all US territory is available for long-range weapons. In September 2017, North Korea announced that it had completed the sixth nuclear and hydrogen bomb test. Donald Trump, in his speech in the United Nations, threatened North Korea with destruction, and on September 23, with Trump's command, American fighters fired over the North Korean coastline on orders from Tramps. The North Korean reaction was the announcement of a nuclear test in the Pacific Ocean. And Washington has also boycotted eight North Korean banks and 26 citizens of this country for funding and attempting to proceed North Korea's nuclear program. In February 2018, during the Winter Olympics games in PyeongChang-gun, a sudden relation was established between the two Koreas and during the negotiations between the North Korean ambassadors and the President of the Republic of Korea, the possibility of North Korea and the United States negotiation about Pyongyang nuclear program was discussed (Shin and Moon, 2018: 38).

Before 1994, the United States used two options including economic sanctions and threats of war to enforce punishment policies. The policy of punishment is based on the assumption that the enemy acts rationally, and based on; US military strategists believe that military threats will be effective in changing the behavior of Pyongyang officials. But the historical events and trends in

the relations between the two countries do not confirm this issue.

As Clinton's plan to deploy South Korean patriot missiles in order to put pressure on Pyongyang and permit inspection of nuclear facilities, not only did not force North Korea to return to the negotiating table, but it also made Pyongyang take on more aggressive policies, because Kim Jong-il guaranteed the survival of the regime regarding the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Pyongyang's permission to inspect nuclear facilities can be seen in this regard as it has strengthened North Korea's bargaining power. On the other hand, since Pyongyang has the least degree of dependence on the world economy, so the economic sanctions option, despite isolating this country and weakening its economy, has not been able to seriously threaten the survival of the Pyongyang's regime to abandon nuclear weapons.

In this regard, Clinton declared in 1994 that North Korea could not be something like another Iraq, indicating that the United States has put its approach based on dicker politics (Kim, 2017: 169). Following the emergence of neoconservatives and the priority of conflicting with terrorism and proliferating of weapons of mass destruction in US foreign policy, the punishment politics have been considered as a North Korean nuclear crisis management approach. Unlike the Cold War period that insurgent and bankrupt governments were not considered a systematic threat and due to the weapons of mass destruction and also the strong incentives of insurgent governments to provide these weapons for terrorist groups, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was one of the main priorities of providing international security. In this regard, the neoconservatives found a desirable opportunity to strengthen the penetration in northeast Asia regarding the fact that the country was in a privileged position and as a result of this position the United States possessed more increased power of maneuver. For US leaders, new conditions have illustrated that although North Korea does not have many elements of power and has a low status in the structure of the international system, it can deal with the vital interests of the United States with serious threats. The introduction of North Korea as one of the axes evils by George Bush implies that optimistic thinking about the availability of peace and stability has lost its legitimacy. Since Pyongyang is a rational player and pursues a nuclear policy to ensure the regime's survival, the exacerbating pressures not only did not increase Pyongyang's cooperation but also has led the country to withdraw from the NPT and carry out a nuclear test. Although North Korea returned to the negotiating table and the two countries reached an agreement in February 2007, but it was after the Pyongyang proved its nuclear capability and participated with the higher side in the negotiations (Snyder, 2007: 49-50).

An examination of the historical trend of relations between the two countries shows that although the two leaders' meeting is unexpected negotiations and efforts to reduce tensions are not new issues in the relations between the two countries. Regarding the structural components (Russia's interest in the continued control of the North Korean nuclear crisis and the United States higher side in the negotiations) and regional dynamics (patterns of interaction between regional actors, polarization in the regional order structure), and national components (the centralized structure of economic, political and military power) it seems that the United States does not accept North Korea as a nuclear power. Also, as mentioned, security threats are one of Pyongyang's most important motivations for pursuing nuclear activities. Regarding the absence of a security regime in the region and the experience of North Korean leaders from the fate of Gaddafi and even Saddam Hussein after delivering and destroying nuclear capabilities, the assumption of rationality and self-control in an anarchical regional system prescribes that the disarmament and becoming non-nuclear scenario will not occur. However, in the statements of the Pyongyang's leaders, the issue of becoming non-nuclear has been mentioned, but its realization requires conditions including particular reliable security guarantees, full disarmament of the region or the prospect of the alliance of two Koreas. Like the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and in the case of providing security guarantees, this issue will not be acceptable to Pyongyang regarding Washington's attitudes to international treaties and its failure in the fidelity.

### **3. Discussion**

Considering numerous nuclear and missile tests by Pyongyang since 2017 and intensifying

threatening verbal actions between North Korean and US authorities in recent months, the chance of negotiation between the two countries was very low or out of mind. The most surprising thing is the acceptance of the negotiation by Pyongyang without any preconditions, because it was expected that considering new nuclear successes, the acceptance of negotiation was conditioned on the fulfillment of the best conditions such as the cancellation of joint military exercises of Seoul-Washington and receive food aid or the most conditions such as acceptance of North Korea's nuclear power. In analyzing North Korea's goals of accepting negotiation with the United States, the following points are worth considering:

First, North Korea's diplomatic isolation has not affected its nuclear activities and its enrichment programs. In other words, during the years of decreasing diplomatic relations between North Korean and South Korea, nuclear activities, especially the enrichment program, have been developed. But in the meantime, as long as Pyongyang achieves its stated nuclear goals within a period, attempts for the negotiating and resolving the tensions will begin again. In other words, North Korean leaders are cleverly pursuing nuclear programs at the same time as trying to prevent a nuclear deadlock and always keep the doors open for negotiations. Because of such circumstances, it has become possible to anticipate the hostile actors' behaviors and reactions (Cha, 2012: 278).

Also, the approach of engaging and expanding diplomatic measures has not led Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear and missile programs. The engagement efforts, such as the Clinton framework from 1994 to 2001 and the six-party negotiations between 2003 and 2009, had a slight impact on slowing down the plutonium plans, but its impact on North Korea's enrichment and missile programs was inconsiderable (Choi, 2013: 107).

Second, it seems that Kim Jong-Un's intention regarding this meeting is to produce legitimacy and to present a powerful national image in the international scene. Due to North Korea's internal situation, direct negotiations between Kim Jong-Un and Trump will boost the popularity of the North Korean leader among the people. The sanctions against North Korea have caused its economy to be small and vulnerable over time, and the adverse economic situation has created social problems for this country. In addition to reducing the amount of trade between North Korea and South Korea and food aid, these conditions have made livelihood problems for the people (Manyin, 2010: 72). As the below table shows, since 2011, not only the amount of trade between North Korea and South Korea has declined, but also there has been a decline in food aid to this country. This situation has made life difficult for people. Under such circumstances, a meeting between North Korea's young leader and Trump can increase this leader's popularity.

Thirdly, the analysis of North Korea's actions and behaviors shows that the country has been in a position to stabilize nuclear deterrence; because of the successful (Husan-15) missile test to carry a ton atomic warhead, up to 4,500 kilometers, would significantly boost deterrence levels of the country. Under such circumstances, North Korea seeks to establish a security regime on the Korean peninsula. A security regime that can create a secure and sustainable environment based on the agreement of all the regional governments for the country. In other words, it seems that North Korea is moving from deterrence to arms control.

The Arms control regime, in which North Korea is accepted as a nuclear power in it, also accepts to set out its behaviors in a set of principles, rules, and norms, for the stability of security in the region and environment base on the patterns of cooperation and friendship. As a matter of fact in such an environment, Pyongyang could certainly pursue its goals and economic interests.

The interdependence of the Korean peninsula's economy and the global economy has led to an increase in regional and international actors' tolerance in the management and resolution of disputes and crises in the region, and the parties to the conflict, as a result of the requirements of the strategic environment and the interconnection of the region with international trends and equations, are trying to use nonviolent methods to relieve tensions and manage crises. The region's interconnection with the global economic system is in such that it has owned 21% of exports and about 21% of global imports. Also, 21% of foreign direct investments are made in this region; besides, the countries of this region owned 61% of the world's economic reserves (Kim, 2017: 166). In such a context, regional and global compulsory forces have led North Korea, the United

States, and other beneficiary actors to display a lot of self-restraint to prevent the escalation of the crisis and the possible occurrence of war.

#### 4. Conclusion

Because two main objectives of North Korea's pursuit of nuclear activities are guaranteeing the survival of the political system through getting a security assurance from the United States and getting economic ransom, and these two countries do not trust each other according to their historical record; it is clear that the negotiations between Trump and Kim Jong-Un are a tactical move to reduce economic pressures and reduce international and regional pressures to enhance nuclear capabilities and strengthen bargaining power in the future. Kim Jong-Un is arguing that Washington's hostility is not just limited to its nuclear program, and the United States is about to change the regime and create a desirable political system in line with its interests and its goals in the region. The negotiations could lead to this optimism that North Korea will be ultimately disarmed considering nuclear and missile, or nuclear and missile activities of North Korea will be recognized by the United States will. Although North Korea, in general, and Kim Jong-Un, in particular, place great value on this issue to be seen at a meeting with the President of the United States. This gives legitimacy to the North Korean leader inside and outside of the country. China and Russia also want to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue in such a way that the balance of power in the region does not change in favor of Japan and the United States. Therefore, it would not be expected that, like Libya, North Korea will shut down all its nuclear activities and abandon its nuclear facilities. In this way, solving the Korean nuclear problem in a gradual process will be in such a way that the Political dynamics and regional interactions are in place to maintain the balance of power in the region.

Also, it seems that Trump and Kim Jong-Un both feel that they are negotiating from the standpoint of power and this issue can determine their tone and expectations. The favorable scenario for the United States would be to agree on a set of principles that the negotiations could continue at a lower level. And the desirable scenario for North Korea could be that, as in 2000, the United States would finish pressures and sanctions of North Korea in exchange for some restrictions on nuclear and missile programs.

#### Acknowledgments

#### References

1. Anderson Nicholas D (2017) in Explaining North Korea's Nuclear Ambitions: Power and Position on the Korean Peninsula. *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 71(6):1-21
2. Avery Emma Chanlett & Sharon Squassoni (2006) North Korea's Nuclear Test: Motivations, Implications and U.S. Options. Available At: <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/rl33709.pdf> (accessed 14 January 2018).
3. Bosworth Stephen (2009) who is dancing with Giant: the Geopolitics of East Asia in Twenty Century. Available At: [www.bos.frb.org/economic/conf/conf51/conf51b.pdf](http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/conf/conf51/conf51b.pdf) (accessed 24 April 2018).
4. Cheng Xiaohe (2013) North Korea's Third Nuclear Test and its Impact on Sino – North Korean Relations. *The Journal of East Asian Affairs* 27(1): 23-46.
5. Choi Jong Kun (2016), the Perils of Strategic Patience with North Korea. *The Washington Quarterly* 38(4):57-72
6. Choi Jinwook (2013) a Game Changer: North Korea's Third Nuclear Test and Northeast Asian Security. *The Journal of East Asian Affairs* 27(1): 99-125
7. Cha V. D (2012) the Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future. New York: Ecco.
8. Cha V. D (2000) Abandonment, Entrapment, and Neoclassical Realism in Asia: The United States, Japan, and Korea. *International Studies Quarterly* 44(2):261-291.

9. Cho E. J. R (2017) Nation Branding for Survival in North Korea: The Arirang Festival and Nuclear Weapons Tests. *Geopolitics* 22(3): 594-622
10. Delury John (2012) Triple-Pronged Engagement: China's Approach to North Korea. *American Foreign Policy Interests* 34 (2): 69-73.
11. Fingar Thomas, et al (2017) Analyzing the Structure and Performance of Kim Jong-Un's Regime. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and Institute for National Security Strategy, Available at: <https://fsi.stanford.edu/publication/analyzingstructure-and-performance-kim-jong-uns-regime> (accessed 24 April 2018).
12. Glaser Bonnie S. & Liang Wang (2008) North Korea: The Beginning of a China-U.S. Partnership? *The Washington Quarterly* 31(3): 165-180.
13. Haggard Stephan and Noland Marcus (2010) Sanctioning North Korea: The Political Economy of Denuclearization and Proliferation. *Asian Survey* 50(30): 539-568.
14. Huntley Wade L (2007) US Policy toward North Korea in Strategic Context: Tempting Goliath's Fate. *Asian Survey* 47 (3): 455-480.
15. Hughes Christopher W (2007) North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: Implications for the Nuclear Ambitions of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. *Asia Policy* 3: 75-104.
16. Hymans Jacques E. C (2008) Assessing North Korean Nuclear Intentions and Capacities: A New Approach. *Journal of East Asian Studies* 8 (2): 259-292.
17. Kang David C (2011) they think they're Normal: Enduring Questions and New Research on North Korea-A Review Essay. *International Security* 36 (3): 142-171.
18. Kim Samuel S (2011), North Korean Foreign Relations in the Post - Cold War World. Available At: <http://www.Strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil>.
19. Kim Inhan (2017) No More Sunshine: The Limits of Engagement with North Korea. *The Washington Quarterly* 40(4):165-181
20. Korean International Trade Association (2017), K-Statistics. Available at: <http://stat.kita.net/stat/nks/sum/SumTotalImpExpList.screen> (accessed 24 April 2018).
21. Lobell, Steven and et al (2009) Neoclassical Realism: The State and Foreign Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
22. Manyin Mark (2010) Food Crisis and North Korea's Aid Diplomacy: Seeking the Path of Least Resistance. In: *New Challenges of North Korean Foreign Policy*. Kyung-Ae Park (eds). New York: Palgrave.
23. Mastro Oriana Skylar (2018) Conflict and Chaos on the Korean Peninsula: Can China's Military Help Secure North Korea's Nuclear Weapons? *International Security* (43) 2: 84-116
24. McEachern Patrick (2018), Comparative authoritarian institutionalism, regime evolution, and stability in North Korea. *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics* XX(X): 1-19.
25. Michishita Narushige (2009), the Future of North Korean Strategy. *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 21 (1): 103-121.
26. Nakato Sachio (2013) Japan's Responses to the North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Responsive Engagement. *The Journal of East Asian Affairs* 2(1): 47-74
27. Schmidt Brian (2005), Competing Realist Conceptions of Power. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 33(3): 523-549
28. Schweller Randall L (2003), the Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism. In: Colin Elman and M. F. Elman (eds) *Progress in International Relations Theory*, Cambridge: MIT Press.
29. Scobell, Andrew (March 2006), Kim Jong IL and North Korea: The Leader and the System, Available At: <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil> (accessed 12 April 2018).
30. Shin Gi-Wook & Moon Rennie J (2018) North Korea in 2017: Closer to Being a Nuclear State, *Asian Survey* 58(1):33-42
31. Sobol Mor(2018) China's peripheral diplomacy: Repeating Europe's errors in dealing with the neighbourhood. *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics* XX(X):1-15.

32. Solingen Etel (2016), Rashomon in North Korea ? Comparing North-East Asian approaches. *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics* 1(2):135–151
33. Snyder Scott (2007) the Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Assessing U.S. and DPRK Negotiation Strategies. *Pacific Focus* XXFF (1): 47-72.

### Authors

Author's picture  
should be in  
grayscale.

Picture size should  
be absolute  
3.18cm in height  
and absolute  
2.65cm in width

**Author's Name**, Author's profile.