

The Political Movement Of *Teuku* In The Event Of A Social Revolution In Aceh

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Abstract

This paper is titled the indict history, ulee balang suing basically just a study that wants to see about how the tradition of historical writing in the past has made a temperamental depiction of a person named Uleebalang, especially after the social revolution of 1946. Some theories ranging from the saga, novels, to books from people's writings who won the "war" stage had rolled out culturally in an extraordinary portion, so that the authenticity of history that should have emerged as a paradigm, then became neglected. This study uses historical methods by emphasizing the sharpness of historical interpretation. The aim is to find and relate a number of facts about the momentum of independence as a place of power struggle that was packed through the social revolution in Aceh in 1946.

Key words : *Indict history, uleebalang suing, Social revolution in Aceh, Aceh Custom*

Introduction

The foreign colonialism in its history in Indonesia, however, has have a sharp impact on the disruption of the social system of traditional society, even which has led to the emergence of frustration and eliminated from its most common form. Some regions have communicated such feelings into a form of widespread anxiety and anxiety to resist. Then it is blown up into an aggressive movement called resistance, struggle, war, even social revolution, generally towards targets that are considered to be opposite or hostile.¹ Social revolutions such as in Tegal, Pematang, Brebes, Banten, Surakarta regency and also East Sumatra, have given a clear thread on who did it and why the revolution was blown up. One thing that is vague, that only the social revolution in Aceh is almost unknown whose mastermind, except that the *Uleebalang* (the head of government in Aceh who led the district level in the structure of government when Indonesia was under the Dutch colonial rule) and *Uleebalang* family, even his close relatives have become systematic victims of the "no man's land" event called the 1946 Aceh social revolution.

After the explosion of the social revolution in Aceh (1946), contemporary writings have provided readings and portrayals that emphasize the dynamics of society in the version that won the stage of "war", and have been directed to justify the actions of one group to another group, which almost impressive to an emotional history felt. As a result, historical facts about the Aceh social revolution, until now it turns out that only talking about the Dutch cunning on the one hand and the accusations about how cruel our own natives (the *Uleebalang*'s clan and the nobility), while the Dutch colonial, and the other parties are only seen as alibi which stands alone. The aristocrats of *Uleebalang* in Aceh were deliberately framed in such a way as if they only resembled colonial accomplices destined to blackmail and antagonize their own people. Likewise, the portrayals of the social revolution in Aceh so far have become very varied,

¹ Sartono Kartodirdjo, *Pemberontakan Petani Banten 1888; Koradisi, Jalan, dan Kelanjutannya, Sebuah Studi, Kasus Mengenai Gerakan Sosial di Indonesia*, terj. Hasan Basri, Jakarta: Pustaka Jaya, 1984, hlm. 15.

depending on the position in which one sees them, even the figure who "won" the stage was no longer certain as the one who ended the historical dialogue about the revolution social Aceh.

Dozens of theories and descriptions, ranging from the saga, novels, and even books from relatives or "stage" owners have been written,² but the incident still cannot explain how many victims there are, how victims must undergo their death (where the grave is), and who exactly *sengkuni* (Puppet figures in Javanese terms that are commonly used in Indonesia) behind the event, except only struggling in building the imagination of works that "win" the stage of the revolution. While the losers and oppressed like it or not have been forced to forget and just follow the moving times.

In terms of historical science, what happened in the social revolution in Aceh was basically just a story about the majesty of individuals, people who felt they had contributed to the design of the revolution, including the results of controlled prejudice. The importance of bringing out the majesty and nobleness of the revolution has even exceeded the limits of historical ethical ethics violations, especially in the case of prolonged "character assassination" against the Aceh aristocracy, and, those who lost in defending their "rights". The interests seem to have ignored scientific principles, and the revolution has judged them in the form of massive and systematic oppression. The empirical study should have the obligation to straighten out, and suppress depictions to fulfill historical obligations and responsibilities. The Association of all Aceh Scholars (PUSA) must be part of the problem of historical rectification, because it has shown how the authority of its authority has taken an important part in coloring historical policy at that time even afterwards.³

Apart from that, the nobles who had been forcibly removed from the stage, the *Uleebalang* (property) site, as well as their traditional identity, were an important part to explain. Likewise, the common thread of the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) in Aceh which had obscured its stage between 1924 and reappeared in the 1960s was a conspirator that deserves to be explained.⁴ The accumulation of such depictions has finally delivered many facts about the 1946 Aceh social revolution, as a floating form and not yet final, because there are so many strange, unexplained aspects. Actors can just write history with decisions that are considered official, but certainly will not be able to prevent people from asking about the constellation that happened behind the incident.

Methods

The author uses descriptive qualitative research type on the grounds that the nature of qualitative research will be able to describe findings naturally and contextually according to the results obtained through subjective data sources. As Matthew B. Miles stated in his *Qualitative Data Analysis* which argues that qualitative research is a series of words and not a number sequence. These data are obtained in various ways such as observation, interview and documentation.⁵ While the research approach is carried out through a phenomenological history approach that happened in Aceh's history

Discussion

I. The History of Indicting

After the great war of 1873 followed by the capture of the Sultan in 1903, the Dutch were so hesitant to change drastically the entire structure and system of government in Aceh, to become structures of power,

² Perhatikan hikayat prang Tjuembok mulai dari karangan Ismail Muhammad, Syekh Min Jeureula, Abdullah Arif, M. Jahja Baden, dan lain-lain. Lihat juga novel "Napoleon Dari Tanah Rencong", Akmal Nasery Basral, 2013. Gramedia Pustaka Utama. Juga Buku karangan M. Nur El Ibrahimy, Hasan Saleh, dll.

⁴ Lihat Fauzi, dkk. 2008. *Pembantaian PKI, Analisis Sosiologis Konflik Ideologis di Aceh 1965-1967*. Lhokseumawe : Universitas Malikul Saleh.

⁵ Matthew B. Miles, *Analisis Data Kualitatif*, (Jakarta: UI-Press, 1992), h. 15

government, and politics in the style of the Dutch colonial. One of the most fundamental reasons is that traditional governmental, political and authority structures are systems that have for centuries been growing in social sensitivity and the Acehese society at large, so that it is feared that this will lead to new problems in creating Dutch political instability in Aceh.

In other words, the Colonial Government had a policy of not just abolishing the existing constitutional system. As a newcomer who wished to control territory in the archipelago, the colonial government fully realized that its existence was not always safe.⁶

The capture of the Sultan, in the history of Aceh, apparently cannot be interpreted as the end of everything, because the *Uleebalang* clan until the end of the Dutch Colonial power still have their own autonomy, both in the context of their duties and responsibilities towards the State (Sultan) as well as for the territory and society within the scope of statehood he led. "Among the great resistance that occurred in all regions in Indonesia in the 19th century, resistance in Aceh must be declared as one of the most severe and longest for the Netherlands".⁷ Therefore, changes in governance that synergized with colonial interests in Aceh could then be implemented by the Dutch around the end of 1922, which meant that the Netherlands needed more than 49 years, only to reform the government system in Aceh (1873 - 1922), whereas the rest only contain stories of war and resistance. This means that during the period of Dutch colonialism in Aceh, resistance and struggle to liberate Aceh from Dutch colonial hands had been carried out continuously by *Uleebalang* (both frontal, guerrilla and nervous warfare) along with the people they led including the scholars. Most of these facts have been reversed in accordance with the interests of a group of people, so as if the role of the *Uleebalang* (aristocrats) as leaders of the war resistance against the Dutch is lost, and replaced by the Scholars card with the people, while the aristocratic group (*Uleebalang*) has been framed became as if the most frightening, hostile to the Scholars and its own people.

Likewise, the matter of winning or losing in a war event throughout the Dutch East Indies land, is a consequence, where finally the *Uleebalang* as the responsible government of the state government, are required by various kinds of binding rules and conditions, including what is called *corteverklaring*. J. Jongejans, reminded that "In an effort to defeat Aceh, in 1874 the Netherlands tried to disturb the balance between these traditional forces by introducing a system of" self-government "power for the *Uleebalang* in the form of *corteverklaring* (short agreements). But in reality the Dutch were not so satisfied with the results of this agreement, so in 1898 they changed it and forced the *Uleebalang* to consider their territory as a part of the Dutch East Indies, and to view the Dutch enemy as their enemy"⁸. Thus, *corteverklaring* is actually a formal consequence as well as the responsibility of a *Uleebalang* who inevitably, like it or not, must be signed as a defeated party in the Dutch war in Aceh, as well as the same conditions that have prevailed throughout the Netherlands Indies.

It is unfortunate, if so the depiction must say differently, only because the owner of the depiction is a winner at the stage of power (history). In the era of PUSA domination, for example, which began in 1939, *corteverklaring* has been seen as an effective propaganda tool in undermining the supremacy of traditional power.⁹ Some of the studies written long after the Aceh social revolution actually maintained it as a joint commitment, and generally generalized so that it was as if there was nothing wrong with what they thought. In a misleading view, *Uleebalang* throughout Aceh have signed *corteverklaring*, as a form

⁶ Dr. H. M. Nur Hasan, *Corak Budaya Birokrasi Pada Masa Kerajaan, Kolonial Belanda Hingga di Era Desentralisasi Dalam Pelayanan Publik*. Jurnal Hukum, Vol XXVIII, No. 2, Desember 2012.

⁷ Marwati Djoened P dan Nugroho N, 1993, *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia IV*, Balai Pustaka, Jakarta, Hlm 241

⁸ J. Jongejans, *Land en Volk van Atjeh, vroeger en nu (Baarn: Hoelandia Drukkerij, 1939)*, hml. 285-286.

⁹ Mestilah diingat bahwa PUSA tidak identik dengan Ulama, munculnya nama-nama seperti Teungku H.Hasan Krueng Kale, Teungku Abdul Jalil Bayu, dan lain-lain, ternyata juga tidak pernah identik dengan apa yang disebut PUSA.

of fear of losing their power over the state and the general population they lead, with the result that *korteverklaring* was then framed as part of the *Uleebalang* conspiracy to defame the people themselves.¹⁰ Diverting facts (accusations) like this, seems to have become a source of reference in many writings afterwards, at least in the same connotation has also been followed by many people and make it a necessary "note". For years after the revolution, the nobles (*Uleebalang*) who had the title "*ampon*" or "*teuku*" could not answer their children's questions about such matters, even though the facts actually said no. A character assassination has been in effect for all time without a valid explanation. So too were the views and propaganda, which had equated the nobles with the term "feudal remains" unilaterally.¹¹

In the concept of local politics some time before and or when the social revolution was blown up in Aceh in 1946,¹² the issues and propaganda that carried hatred against the *Uleebalang* might be understood (needed) as a form of political propaganda in order to attract the sympathy of the general public to support the revolution, for a planned movement. However, it should be realized only as a mere political mission and propaganda, not as a definite historical generalization and should be inherited or maintained culturally. The fact that it has been used as a media for justification and distortion of history systematically, it is evident that such generalizations imprint as references that are considered "*halal*". As a direct result of not wanting to be blamed, the history of the Aceh social revolution is still unknown.

In the historical record of the betrayal in Aceh, Habib Abdurrahman Az-Zahir is a fact that is to be debated. Zentgraff, noted that the history of betrayal began on October 13, 1878, when Habib Abdurrahman officially surrendered and cooperated with the Dutch, and as a form of respect he had even been greeted with seven cannon blasts.¹³ Complementing his position as a traitor, on November 24 of that year he also departed for Jeddah and received an allowance from the Netherlands of 12,000 dollars every year.¹⁴

Habib Abdurrahman Az-Zahir and *Panglima Tibang* (an important figure in the kingdom of Aceh) were political adventurers, and Habib's surrender in 1878 was sufficient to prove this.¹⁵ But the fact of this kind of betrayal has never been a reference and was mentioned in the political propaganda of the 1946 Aceh social revolution, even by many of the subsequent studies that were described by stakeholders. On the other hand, the paradigm of various theories about Aceh's social revolution (1946), in fact only concerns about the red thread of *Korte Verklaring*, so that in such a view it is as if *Korte Verklaring* only applies in the history of Aceh. Like a "conspiracy", important figures even agreed and had framing nobles (*Uleebalang*) as seemingly hostile to the Scholars of their own people,¹⁶ by relying on the centric analysis of the colonial which is considered more "sacred".

In the historical, nomenclature of Dutch colonial rule throughout the land of the Dutch East Indies, it has never been found where the *Korte Verklaring* can be signed apart from other parties, except the rule of leader of the country (*Uleebalang*), or such as *Adipati* on the island of *Java*,¹⁷ *Tumenggung*, *Kraeng*, *Datu*, and others. In their status and responsibilities as local leaders who are legitimate and

¹⁰ Hasan Saleh, 1992. "Mengapa Aceh Bergolak, bertarung untuk kepentingan bangsa dan bersabung untuk kepentingan daerah". Jakarta, 1992. Pustaka Utama Grafiti, hlm. 15.

¹¹ Lihat M. Nur El Ibrahimy, 1982. Tgk. M. Daud Beureueh dan Peranannya Dalam Pergolakan Di Aceh", Jakarta, PT. Gunung Agung. Dalam buku terhadap mertuanya sendiri ia berusaha melakukan pembenaran sejarah dengan menggambarkannya kaum *Uleebalang* sebagai sisa-sisa feodal, dengan mengulang-ulang istilah "feodal" itu sebanyak lebih dari 89 kali.

¹² Sebenarnya revolusi sosial itu substansinya adalah peristiwa perebutan kekuasaan yang illegal dan terlalu dipaksakan (kudeta).

¹³ Zentgraff, H.C. "Atjeh", Terjemahan Firdaus Burhan, Batavia. Koninklijke Drukkerij De Unie, tanpa tahun.

¹⁴ Muchtaruddin Ibrahim, "Cut Nyak Din, 1996. Jakarta, Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan RI, hlm. 34.

¹⁵ Selanjutnya lihat Zakaria Ahmad, ad.all, "Sejarah Perlawanan Terhadap Kolonialisme dan Imperialisme Di Daerah Aceh. 1992. Jakarta, Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, hlm. 52.

¹⁶ Lihat Hasan Saleh, *ibid*, hlm. 16.

¹⁷ *Adipati* (bahasa Sanskerta, *adhipati*) yang berarti "tuan, kepala, atasan; pangeran, tuan tertinggi, raja, adalah sebuah gelar kebangsawanan untuk orang yang menjabat sebagai kepala wilayah yang tunduk/bawahan dalam struktur pemerintahan kerajaan di Nusantara, seperti di Jawa dan Kalimantan.

recognized customarily, then the signing of the *Korte Verklaring* should not be equated with the terms "henchman" and also "hostile to the people", so that such views are basically more a form of sentiment statement and provocative, a defamation and character assassination that should end immediately. Some evidences later denied this accusation by continuing to involve the nobles (*Uleebalang*) and their instruments in carrying out resistance to the Dutch colonials, even in later periods.

Sociologically, a revolution can indeed be considered reasonable if it builds a propaganda issue that is able to give birth or unite the wishes of the wider community to make changes, is the emergence of a group of people or people who are dissatisfied with a situation.¹⁸ Propaganda in the Aceh social revolution will indeed be so important, because propaganda is basically a matter of how to collaborate political messages in order to gain influence. However, the propaganda and studies and portrayals of the 1946 Acehnese social revolution that had the tone of agitation were basically only systematic attempts to shape public opinion according to the wishes of those who did it. Jozef Goebbels, Minister of Nazi Propaganda in Hitler's time, said: Spread lies repeatedly to the public, because repeated lies will make the public believe (Propaganda Communication An Introduction, Muhajir Affandi. 2017: 15). Regarding this lie, Goebbels also teaches that the biggest lie is the truth which is changed only slightly. If there is an event that happens and becomes a fact, then the facts are then "twisted" a little and disseminated with certain techniques, then immediately it will be an effective propaganda. It should be realized that propaganda will end when the goal has been achieved, but in reality in the description of the social revolution in Aceh, propaganda has instead been seen as a justification for maintaining what is hidden behind the tragedy. With propaganda, people can create "heaven", but with propaganda also people can create "hell" in the midst of a community.

II. Uleebalang Suing.

The events of the Aceh social revolution in 1946 or often also called *Prang Cumbok*, in fact only started from the issue of self-esteem which was then used as a momentum for the struggle for power, from the traditional *Uleebalang* elite to the new elite led by the PUSA and sharpened by the PKI. News about the independence of the Republic of Indonesia, which reached Aceh in October 1945, on the one hand meant a return to the traditional sovereign state system of government, which had for centuries been rooted in Aceh's historical trajectory, and Aceh was actually able to become its own State at that time. Thus, it is the customary landowners (*Uleebalang*) who should be the initiators to seek options to determine the steps in addressing the importance of Indonesia's independence on 17 August 1945 for the Aceh region. But on the other hand, the new elite group which was raised and respected by the *Uleebalangs* since 1939, had actually taken the opportunity and made a unilateral decision by making the news of the independence of the Indonesian republic a shield to reject and usurp power from the hands of the traditional *Uleebalang* elite.

Independence in the end was no longer the main goal of the revolutionary struggle at that time in Aceh, but had manifested itself in a struggle for self-esteem and the struggle for power. The climax of the battle for self-esteem was later legalized by the issuance of a threat of total war against the traditional government (*Uleebalang*) on January 18, 1946. Syamaun Gaharu, led by the PUSA and its political wing, on behalf of the Aceh Regional Headquarters, and T.P.P. Muhammad Ali on behalf of the Aceh Regional Government, in fact declared the *Uleebalangs* as traitors to independence, while simultaneously being enemies of the Republic of Indonesia.¹⁹

In the context of a sovereign state²⁰ after Japan's surrender which surrendered to allies, then actually what was done by Syamaun Gaharu and his allies by issuing war calls against traditional

¹⁸ Soerjono Soekanto, *Sosiologi suatu pengantar*, PT. Raja Grafindo Persada, edisi cetakan duapuluh delapan, 1999, Jakarta. Hlm. 347-348

¹⁹ Lihat Daud, A., *Husda*, at,all 2010. *Aceh dari Konflik ke Damai*. Banda Aceh: Bandar Publishing, hlm.2

²⁰ Lihat juga Drs. Anas Mahmud, 1988. *Kedaulatan Aceh yang tidak pernah diserahkan kepada Belanda adalah bagian dari kedaulatan Indonesia*. Jakarta, Bulan Bintang.

sovereign power (*Uleebalang*), the point is an act of coup. In the view of Samuel P. Huntington, he called this kind of action "*Breakthrough coup d'etat*", an event that occurred when the military launched a revolution to overthrow traditional government, and create a new bureaucratic elite.²¹ The position of Syamaun Gaharu as the Commander of the Kutaraja Regional Headquarters at that time (1945), and the collaboration of the PUSA its political ranks and the masses of the general public who were insecure, as well as the presence of an appropriate central figure, made it possible for him to support and carry out military attacks for power struggles from the hands of the traditional elite.

The sudden momentum of independence was a good opportunity to launch a revolution and struggle for power, even though the good opportunity actually began with the loss of Japanese power in Aceh which resulted in a time when the *Uleebalang* government was practically weak and uncertain, at least not yet able to carry out the obligation to the maximum. In other terms is the emergence of a "*gezagsvacuum*", whereby every human being can act arbitrarily, arbitrarily, where the Laws and Regulations of the State, or customs of manners that guarantee the perfection of life's journey in something in the community, disappear completely, so that a situation arises, where only weapons and power are enthroned.²²

The issuance of an ultimatum so that the *Uleebalang* government must surrender unconditionally to a new elite led by the PUSA on January 18, 1946, basically did not have any legal basis, except for a statement about the birth of the transfer of power (*coup d'etat*). *Uleebalang* at the time Jakarta had just declared its independence, however actually is a legitimate government in Aceh, so that to him a state decision can be followed up, and the demand that the "state" surrender to Syamaun Gaharu be a strange mistake. Likewise, the use of the term "on behalf of the Aceh Regional General Headquarters" in an ultimatum to the authority of *Uleebalang*, is in fact a symbol for the birth of rival power (assault). In general, the ultimatum contains that all *Uleebalang* governments centered in *Cumbok*, *Lameulo*, and other places throughout Aceh who hold weapons and carry out their resistance to the general public,²³ are traitors and enemies of the Republic of Indonesia, and if until January 10, 1946 not surrender. will be subject to violence.²⁴ Within these limits, surrender is not really a matter of winning or losing, but just a question of the dignity of the State of Aceh.

There are many misleading portrayals of the power struggle in Aceh in 1946, among them using the thesis that the *Uleebalangs* did not want independence, they wanted to become a colony again under Dutch colonial rule. A group that aspires to restore Dutch colonial rule, are those who still have memories of the pleasures of life during the Dutch administration, and before Japan took control of Aceh. Those who have high positions that provide them with opportunities, live in luxury. The return of the Netherlands also meant the return of life filled with pleasure, grandeur and luxury.²⁵ These grave accusations were further compounded by portrayals of the amount of Dutch money and the Dutch flag in the deposits of the *Uleebalang* (*Combok*), which generalized the *Uleebalang* to want a return of Dutch colonialism. So this thesis is then culturally generalized to each generation.

However, in reality that such objects have never been handed over to the owners of the ruling power at that time, even today such evidence has left a number of reasons to doubt the truth of the historical depiction of the Aceh social revolution. Even if these accusations and objects are contained in the deposits of the *Uleebalangs*, this is naive to justify such a strange depiction. So the historical generalization of *Uleebalang* as a traitor to the state should be a matter that must be re-accused. In other

²¹ Huntington, Samuel P. 1996. *The Clash of Civilization and Remarking of World Order*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

²² *Insider*, 1950, *ibid*, hlm. 8

²³ *Dalam hal ini sebenarnya yang dimaksud dengan rakyat umum dalam ultimatum tersebut adalah kekuatan rakyat yang terkoordinir, PUSA, dan seluruh organisasi sayap yang berada dibawahnya, sehingga seolah-olah rakyat umum dengan demikian adalah milik dari Syamaun Gaharu selaku penguasa militer saat itu.*

²⁴ Daud, A., *Husda*, at,all. *Ibid*.

²⁵ *Insider*, 1950. *ibid*, hlm. 5.

words, how was the actual position of the PUSA at the time, so that there were similar issues with the revolutionary model that occurred in East Sumatra.

In a healthy historical rationality, there is no colonized society that wants to return to being a colonized nation, no matter how sensitive a society is it still wants to become an independent nation, and for this reason the birth of a struggle in society everywhere. Thus the issuance of an ultimatum on the basis of the *Uleebalang* siding with the Dutch even wanted the return of colonial power to Aceh to be unfounded, except that the ultimatum 18 January 1946 was a tangible proof of an act of treason, a forced struggle for power.

One of the aims of the power struggle during the social revolution was to improve the government in the newly contested Aceh, namely by removing the elements in the understanding of the PUSA authorities (TPR or People's Struggle Army) Husin Al Mujahid "hindered the course of the national revolution".²⁶ This event turned out to give birth to the new PUSA government policy to eliminate all *Uleebalangs*, relatives, even people suspected of being close to those he called "feudal remains", starting from the Idi, Tamiang, Langsa, Lhok Sukon, Lhokseumawe, Bireuen, Samalanga, Meureudu, Sigli, and so on until the capital of the Aceh residency, in Banda Aceh, has even expanded in almost all of Aceh.

Starting with a limited number of people and weapons, from their departure from Idi to reach Banda Aceh, this number grew and resembled a terrible mob. The people who participated in the group carried out certain roles, ranging from the process of arrest, killing, looting and deprivation of freedom to acts of exile. One thing that is no less terrible is the involvement of *Nyak Neh* as a leader of PESINDO (Indonesian Socialist Youth) who continued the same movement to West Aceh and its surroundings. PESINDO was then a group of six Marxist-leaning organizations which merged into one organization based on the results of the November 11, 1945 congress, so that the core activists were communist figures, namely Ruslan Widjajasastra, Tjugito, Sudisman, Djalaluddin Jusuf Nasution and others.²⁷ Based on the methods of power struggles, killings, arrests and exile that occurred in the case of the 1946 Aceh social revolution, which in essence are not different from the social revolution in East Sumatra, it is clear who the mastermind is, then in normal historical measures what actually happened at almost the same time in Aceh it was a strange situation, so PESINDO's involvement in this matter was a common thread that also needed to be indicted. An event that contains extraordinary sadness, where the state authorities (*Uleebalangs*) are treated in a very despicable way by a group that seems wild, but coordinated, systematic, massive, and the omission in a long time.

Teuku Nya 'Arif, the resident, is the most unique example in such a context, a nationalist movement which is always on the side of those who oppose the occupation and the establishment of the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia, a person known as the public defender, soon afterwards also told of insults this, and at the end of 1946 he left this mortal world of exile with no clear reason. In this case, a wise view of Charles Tilly, states that "social movements are organized, sustained, even sustained, even sustained. reject self-conscious, and there is a common identity (shared identity) between those involved in it."²⁸

In the context of the deception and historical description written by "generals who won the war" so far, the ideals "to improve governance in Aceh", have been annulled through the birth of methods of killing, arrest, kidnapping, and alienation and relatives of *Uleebalang* who up to now also how many have not been known, starting from the Pidie area to the whole of Aceh. The ideals that are considered "his"

²⁶ *Pasca penangkapan terhadap Teuku Nyak Arif, ia bahkan mengangkat dirinya sendiri sebagai Mayor Jendral.*

²⁷ *PESINDO bermula dari API (Angkatan Pemuda Indonesia (API), organisasi ini dipimpin oleh seorang pemuda bernama Wikana, seorang sosialis. Ia memiliki seorang asisten bernama DN Aidit. Sebagai sebuah organisasi yang dipimpin seorang sosialis komunis, tak heran jika di tubuh API juga penuh dengan intrik dan propaganda.*

²⁸ *Charles Tilly, "Social Movement and National Politics" dalam Charles Bright and Sandra Harding (Eds), State-Making and Social Movements: Essays in History and Theory (Ann-Arbor Michigan: University of Michigan Press), hal. 303.*

noble at the same time have also slaughtered completely and obliterated all social institutions and power of *Ulebalang*, which for centuries have participated in celebrating the Sultanate of Aceh throughout the history of the five major Islamic empires of the world.²⁹ The ideals led by the PUSA and its allies in Aceh at the time, both in the West and East, in the North, South and also the Central part of the residency, had acted, urged, and forced, the sovereign officials (*Ulebalang*) who were still active to give up their power to them.

The aims "to improve governance in Aceh", therefore have followed the rules of the appointment and appointment of positions in the new government desired by the victors of the revolution (PUSA), that is, those who have succeeded in seizing power, even though it is realized that positions it is then held by inexperienced. The character assassination of the *Uleebalang* was even carried out in remote areas, where the social structure that was previously based on adat had changed according to the dynamics and rhythms desired. In the current context of Aceh, it is being preoccupied by discussions on how to uphold and implement of custom, while its substance has long been buried with obstacles soil. Spread of propaganda and historical depictions of a movement towards "Extermination of Traitors of Religion and Nation", that the *Uleebalang* were Dutch accomplices who tried to subvert the Republic, which was always in contact with the Dutch in Sabang or on diving ships that muddled in Aceh, *Cumbok* and and the crony is not God, trampling, tearing the Qur'an and forbidding people to pray,³⁰ is the most extreme form of character killing, in the history of crimes against humanity in Aceh.³¹ With the result that historical depictions of irresponsible propaganda like this (*het doel heiligt de middelen*) must be immediately accounted for in an open customary reconciliation, including in the matter of the spoils (*verbeurd verklaard*) of the *Uleebalang* that has never been accounted for until now.

Conclusion

History is a dialogue that has never been completed between the present and the past (EH Carr), and the events of the 1946 Aceh social revolution can be considered over because there have been too many depictions about it that debate contention, but have never answered who is the mastermind (responsible answer) behind the incident. All of these testimonies could have given rise to the glory of a figure who won the war, but the question is how objective the authenticity and credibility of the evidence could explain how important was the Aceh social revolution (1946) when it had to be blown up, and how to resolve the current dialogue about thinking between social revolution or power struggle.

Thus, that the Revolution in the description of Charles Tilly, is "a special case of collective action where basically people (groups) will compete for the highest political sovereignty over society" (Dinar Widiyanta, 2004: 33), so according to Tilly, "the revolution is really just an attempt to struggle for and or transfer of power (Transfer of Power)", and generally such a revolution is to replace the power from what was before (transfer of power). In addition, Tilly also stressed the importance of seeing social movements in the context of the span of history, or in other words a social movement should have its historical background, and this also has clearly differentiated between what has been called a social movement with other forms of political activity. In other words, not all forms of popular movements, popular actions in the name of something, and all people or organizations that support these things can be called social movements.³²

²⁹ Charles Tilly, "Social Movement and National Politics" dalam Charles Bright and Sandra Harding (Eds), *State-Making and Social Movements: Essays in History and Theory* (Ann-Arbor Michigan: University of Michigan Press), hal. 303.

³⁰ *Insider*, *ibid.* Hlm.15

³¹ Lihat juga sebab-sebab atas peristiwa penculikan terhadap Amir Husin Al Mujahid pada bulan Maret 1946, dan apa latar belakang munculnya gerakan dua bersaudara Husin Sab dan Sab Cut beserta pengikutnya di Gigieng, Pidie. Serta gerakan Said Ali Alsagaffcs atas penyimpangan gerakan PUSA.

³² Charles Tilly, *Social Movements 1768-2004* (London: Paradigm Publishers, 2004), hal. 7.

Historical thinking sometimes requires us to bring together two conflicting views; first, the way of thinking that we have used so far is an inheritance that we cannot get rid of, and, secondly, if we do not try to get rid of that inheritance, we inevitably have to use "presentism" which makes a deadlock on those thoughts, who see the past with glasses now (Sam Wineburg).³³ The Aceh social revolution of 1946 should not be seen as an individual (single) work, but rather a collective work of the people, so there is no need to leave a number of doubts about massive history. Ignoring complex situations between incidents and the sequence of incidents that systematically determine the causal relations in the Aceh social revolution should be useful momentum in passing down historical facts.

Finally, once lying, there will be new lies, Allah subhaanahu wa ta'aalaa said:
"Surely those who invent lies, only those who do not believe in the verses of Allah, and they are liars."
An-Nahl: 105.

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