

Islami Jamhoori Ittihad¹ (IJI) as Religio-political Alliance: A Study of the Role of Print Media in IJI Promotion in the 1988 and 1990 Elections in Pakistan

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Abstract

The present article aims to discuss the role of media and establishment in the formation and propagation of one of the most crucial and controversial alliances in the electoral history of Pakistan; Islami Jamhoori Ittihad (IJI). This study, through media reports, books, judicial verdicts, and academic articles highlight two basic myths associated with the IJI formation and promotion; first, it is believed that the establishment through state resources formed and promoted IJI that later proved in the Supreme Court verdict in 2012. Secondly, this alliance formed to oppose the growing political strength of Pakistan Peoples' Party (PPP) and to prevent it to make government. Furthermore, this article exposes why IJI didn't succeed to maintain its alliance for a longer period and the failure of the religio-political parties to attract the voters' attention. This paper concludes that the IJI alliance was a need of the hour for the establishment to control the political strength of PPP and when it was fulfilled, the establishment stopped its support and IJI dissolved.

Keywords: Islami Jamhoori Ittihad (IJI), religio-political alliance, Pakistan Muslim League, 1988 Elections, Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD)

Introduction:

Pakistan came into being in the name of Islam as an ideological Islamic State in 1947 and the basic motive behind the separation from the Hindus was religion. No doubt religious parties along with political parties played a significant role in promoting Pakistan Movement. However, in the same way, after Pakistan's creation, both political and religious parties struggled to achieve powers and representation in the National as well as Provincial Assemblies. Ideally, the role of a political party in any country has its centric position in the matters of state as well as modernizing the political system. Its role considered a significant element of the transformation of the socio-political norms of the country and articulation of the aspirations of the citizens of the state. Basically, the crucial role of political parties starts when they truly reflect the public opinion and will in the institutions of the state. They become the voice of the masses during elections and are responded similarly in the elections by people based on manifesto, agenda or point of view that highlights the necessities, desires and up-right things of the society.

For the successful execution and transformation of public will into the political will, political parties perform the role of an inevitable instrument, particularly, after the British colonial regime dissolution in the subcontinent that for the first time introduced a democratic government system. Therefore, from monarchy to democratic rule, political parties significantly involve in 'public interests' articulation', their 'aggregation' and channelize them through the political system to purposeful decisions and policies for the betterment of common masses (Azhar and Muhammd, 2016). Therefore, each political party either secular or religious channelize the historical references, ideological abstraction, religious, social and cultural symbols for promoting and creating social and political awareness among people. Besides, these parties are utilized to

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mobilize the masses availing the culture and social realities along with predefined notions and ideologies through political agendas and manifestos.

According to Caton (2007), there are four basic objectives that the political parties illustrate to the community. First, they play their role in the formulation of programs and policies to elevate the socioeconomic surroundings of the peoples under the realm of great national interests. Secondly, these political parties provide platforms to breed leaders and discover their abilities to lead people. Besides, such parties induct new talents and train them to run the democratic system of the country. Thirdly, these parties help people to speak for their rights and point of view and make listen by the national and international audiences to maximize their electoral support during elections. Finally, all parties strive for political power and agendas that can attract more people to get electoral support for winning elections (Caton, 2007).

According to Azhar and Muhammad (2015), Pakistan is the only country where political freedom is boundary-less. Everyone has a right to develop a political party either based on religious, secular or in any shape. Despite checkless freedom, religiopolitical forces failed to Islamize the state and society. At the time of partition, there were only six religious political parties, including, Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), Khaksar Thehreek, Tehreek-e-Ahrar, Jamat-e-Ahl-e-Hadith, and Shia Political (p. 56).

In Pakistan, political alliances have a long and complicated history because most of them made during almost every election for various reasons and political benefits at different times. Conventionally, the political alliances made for electoral seasons to attain short term targets; gained either fully or partially. None of the political alliance, however, due to numerous reasons could remain intact and united for a longer time. *Islami Jamhoori Ittihad* (IJI) was also one of such alliances that proved short term unification of religiopolitical parties. Although, the purpose behind IJI formation was to lead this alliance for a longer period and it would eventually be converted into one strong national political party from just an alliance but it remained an indefinable dream. The present paper is an attempt to discuss in detail the brief history of IJI, its formation, the role of media and establishment behind its formation, its role in general elections of 1988, 1990, and 1993 and finally its dissolution. This paper also discusses the role of President of Pakistan at that time Ghulam Ishaq Khan, the Army Chief of Staff General Aslam Beg and ISI Director General Hamid Gul in IJI promotion and utilization for political gains.

In the political history of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, among many other most operated political alliances *Islami Jamhoori Ittihad* (IJI) was one of such needs of the hour in 1988. This was collusion of nine various political and religious parties against Pakistan Peoples' Party (PPP) during the national elections of 1988. This IJI alliance was not an organized and planned effort rather it was built-up gradually as firstly two major political parties; Mustafa Jatoi's National Peoples' Party (NPP) and Nawaz Sharief's Pakistan Muslim League (PML) group decided to contest elections jointly, however, later some other small religious and political parties including Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) had joined that alliance.

The agenda behind this political alliance was not any significant ideological cohesion rather create a resistant force to prevent PPP from taking a winning position in the election and for the implementation of Islamic law (Sharia) throughout the country. Due to its imprecise agenda, IJI didn't survive for a long time and contested two elections in four years under one electoral symbol. In the two elections, IJI gave a very tough contest to PPP whereas PPP won that election and ruled from 1988 to 1990. Subsequently, IJI remained successful in the next elections contested in 1990 and made its government in the National and all Provincial assemblies. Finally, in 1993 with the dismissal of government alleged and suspended under section 58-2B, this alliance was officially disbanded.

Therefore, IJI is considered the most provocative political coalition in the political history of Pakistan. According to the previous studies (Azhar, 2019; Azhar & Muhammad, 2015; Malik, 2015; Khan, 2009 and Rana, 2011), there are numerous myths prevailed about the formation of IJI. It is stated that this was an unnatural alliance that put its command performance under the patronages of the army's agency Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Further, it was believed that this political coalition had been established to oppose the rising popularity of the PPP and therefore, put aside from winning position and to avert the PPP to make its government. Moreover, this alliance as IJI had possessed all the typical and traditional procedures that the previous political coalitions and alliances followed in the political history of Pakistan (Malik, 2015). Hence, this current study is an effort to analyze motives and political gains set by the establishment and major

political parties and to find the answers to the following questions that how and why IJI formed and the role of establishment and print and electronic media in its promulgation and projection.

Formation and Dissolution of *The Islami Jamhoori Ittihad (IJI)*:

In September 1988, PML and NPP decided to stop PPP from winning the general elections that year and as result, some other small political and religious parties joined them and consequently, Islami Jamhoori Ittihad (IJI) was established. IJI was pro-establishment set-up, however, this alliance had no targeted long-lasting organized political agenda in its constitution since its first day. Therefore, the agenda behind this political alliance was not any significant ideological cohesion rather create a resistant force to prevent PPP from taking winning positions in the election and for the implementation of Islamic law (Sharia) throughout the country. This alliance included both purely political and religious ideologies to gain shared benefits in the general elections in 1988. The main stakeholders were from the religious parties Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) and other major political parties were Jatoy's NPP, Sharief's PML.

This election proved a nightmare for IJI and its promoters that in the National Assembly (NA) IJI only secured fifty-three seats while their competitor the Pakistan Peoples' Party (PPP) won more than ninety-two seats and made government in the center. This was the first time when Benazir Bhutto, a female, became the first Muslim Prime Minister of any Muslim state. The religious parties gave verdict and fatwas against her that a woman could not become the head of state, however, these verdicts remained useless and she took the oath successfully.

Fortunately, IJI remained successful in minting its presence in the biggest province Punjab and won most of the NA seats from there along with Provincial Assembly seats. The IJI alliance gave a push to the PML Nawaz group in this election and emerged as the leading politician after the PPP's Benazir Bhutto. This is why Nawaz Sharief became the chief minister of Punjab in December 1988 after successfully forming the IJI administration in Punjab (Malik, 2015). This was the booming point of his Sharief's political career that pushed him through the political battles to eventually succeeded as the Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan in the 1990 elections.

In the charged atmosphere of the next general elections in 1990, the voters astonished the spectators. The observers were looking forward to a coalition government because no political party had shown the winning momentum during election campaigns. In general experts' opinion, neither the PPP nor the IJI was anticipated to come up with a firm mandate to become in a position to make its government easily. Finally, the results on election day showed that the IJI received a heavy mandate to establish its government by captivating 105 seats versus 45 seats for another alliance where PPP held the majority support through the Pakistan Democratic Alliance (PDA) to attain more seats in the National Assembly of Pakistan. However, the IJI defeated PDA and Nawaz Sharief became the Prime Minister of Pakistan for the first time.

Just after two years, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan dismissed PML's government and announced new elections. During these general elections in 1993, the PML remained unsuccessful in bringing together all anti-Pakistan Peoples' Party forces and therefore, the IJI coalition dissolved after four years' alliance. These elections exposed that the religious parties including JI and JUIF spent most of their time and efforts to make a practicable and effective religiopolitical electoral coalition instead of supporting the sustaining candidacy of Nawaz Sharif, the only candidate who has the ability to challenge and defeating Benazir Bhutto at that time (*Islami Jamhoori Ittehad*, n. d., p. 1).

IJI and General Election of 1988:

The formation of IJI during these elections consisted of the mandate PML and NPP two major political parties decided to contest the election against PPP in 1988. At that time, most of the religiopolitical parties except Jamate-i-Islami (JI) and few others, all the six major religious parties including Jamiat-e-Ahle-Hadees Pakistan, Jamiat Ulma-e-Islam Fazal-ur-Rehman group JUI(F), Tehrk-e-Nafaz-e-Fiqah-e-Jafaria, Jammatt-e-Ahle_sunnat, JUI (Darkhasti), Tehreek-e-inqilab-e-Islam made a separate alliance and contested elections separately without being any part of the biggest alliance of IJI at that time. It was the general perception that the formation of IJI was to give a setback to the PPP and marginalize its winning position.

Through national electronic and print media including the support of establishment as in an interview to a local newspaper *The News* in 2009 ex-army General and ISI Chief Hamid Gul stated that if IJI had not been established, Pakistan Peoples' Party could easily achieve one-sided victory during the 1988 general elections (Gul, 2009). He further exposed that 'the establishment and army want to unite all anti-PPP parties to one

platform, particularly, those religiopolitical and political parties that had affiliations with General Head Quarters (GHQ) (Gul, 2009). Unexpectedly, the religious parties didn't succeed in gaining the support of the voters in elections while JI being the part of great alliance IJI at that time remained successful in winning a few seats from Punjab and NWFP later named Khyber Pakhton Khawa (KPK). However, from religiopolitical parties, only JUI (F) received public support and won seven seats of the National Assembly from NWFP and Baluchistan. This was the first time that a religious political party from Baluchistan and other provinces managed to gain 2% voters supports. In so doing, JIU (F) emerged at a provincial level in Baluchistan as the single party with the heavy mandate of 11 seats out of 44 provincial members but unluckily they couldn't succeed in capturing Chief Minister's designation. From all religiopolitical parties, except JI and JUI (F) others faced the music as they didn't win even a single seat to become a part of the National Assembly. On the other hand, JUI split into different groups after the poor performance in elections and reduced to almost the threshold of no-entry (Azhar & Muhammad, 2015). The following table 1 shows the final results of the 1988 elections and the electoral performance of the political alliances with religiopolitical parties and without them.

Table 1: Electoral performance of political parties in the 1988 elections

Political Party	Muslim Seats					Reserved Seats		Total
	Punjab	Sindh	NWFP	Baluchistan	Total	Non-Muslim	Women	
ANP	None	None	2	None	2	None	None	2
BNA	None	None	None	2	2	None	None	2
IJI	45	None	8	2	55	Non	5	60
JUI (F)	None	None	3	4	7	Non	1	8
MQM	None	13	None	None	13	None	1	14
NPP	None	1	None	None	1	None	None	1
PAI	3	None	None	None	3	None	None	3
PDP	1	None	None	None	1	None	None	1
PPP	53	31	9	1	94	10	12	116
Independents	12	2	11	2	27	None	1	28
Vacant								2

Source: www.elections.com.pk

IJI and General Elections of 1990:

The PPPs government just survived for two years and in 1990, new elections were declared. This was the third consecutive general election the Pakistani political and electoral history witnessed within only eight years. The alliance politics again repeated in this election where PDA; a PPP led coalition with religiopolitical parties such as Tehreek Nifaaz-e-Jafrea, contested against the IJI coalition with the religiopolitical support of JI and other religious parties. This time IJI alliance led the elections with the heavy mandate and defeated PDA to sustain its popularity among voters who supported them in the 1988 elections. However, the other religiopolitical parties who didn't become the part of any major alliance like IJI and PDA were JUP (N) and JUI (F). Both parties maintained their electoral entities separately and succeeded to win the National Assembly seats. The popularity graph of JUI (F) among voters through overall electoral support rose from 2% to 3% but it had lost its grip on the previous performance in Baluchistan during the 1988 elections. This time JUI (F) succeeded in winning 4 National Assembly (NA) seats from NWFP (now KPK) while JUP (N) succeeded in maintaining 3 NA seats. Except for JUP (N) and JUI (F), all other religiopolitical parties remained unsuccessful in getting electoral support from their voters and failed to achieve even a single seat in the National Assembly in the 1990 elections. The following table shows the results of the 1990 election, in particular, the electoral performance of the political, religiopolitical, and independent parties with and without an alliance.

Table 2: Electoral performance of political parties in the 1990 elections

Political Party	Muslim Seats					Total
	Punjab	Sindh	NWFP	Baluchistan	FATA	
ANP	None	None	6	None	None	6

IJI	91	3	8	2	None	104
JUI (F)	None	None	4	2	None	6
JUP (N)	3	None	None	None	None	3
JWP	None	None	None	2	None	2
MQM	None	15	None	None	None	15
PDA	14	24	5	2	None	45
PKMAP	None	None	None	1	None	1
PNP	None	None	None	2	None	2
Independents	6	4	3	None	8	21
Vacant						

Source: Khan, 2009.

General Elections of the 1993 as the Election of Alliances:

Nawaz Shrief and his party met with ill-fate just after the two years of the 1990s elections, the President of Pakistan at that time Ghulam Ishaq Khan dismissed PML's government on the charges of corruption under section 58-2B and announced new elections. During these general elections in the 1993, the PML remained unsuccessful in bringing together all anti Pakistan Peoples' Party forces and therefore, the IJI coalition dissolved after four years' alliance. These elections exposed that the religio-political parties including JI and JUI (F) spent most of their time and efforts to make a practicable and effective religio-political electoral coalition instead of supporting the sustaining candidacy of Nawaz Sharif, the only candidate who has the ability of challenging and defeating Benazir Bhutto at that time (The US Library of Congress, n. d., p. 1).

Unlike the 1990 elections, this time in the 1993 elections all political and religious political parties formed and joined various alliances except four parties including Hazara Front (HF), Awami National Party (ANP), Pakistan National Party (PNP), and Pakistan Muslim League-Qayyum PML (Q). This is why this election was labelled as the election of alliances in the electoral history of Pakistan. This time IJI met with hard luck and ill-fate that just before the elections, its major stakeholder PML (N) decided not to become a part of any coalition and contest elections independently. Similarly, other religio-political parties spent most of their energies and time in formulating electoral alliances rather than boosting and supporting Nawaz Shrief, the only candidate who could challenge the PPPs candidate Benazir Bhutto. In so doing, JUP (N) and JUI (F) successfully developed Islami Jamhoori Mahaz (IJM) as their separate electoral alliance and succeeded in formulating seat adjustments for 1993 elections. After dissolution of IJI, the chief of Jamat-e-Islami (JI) Qazi Hussian Ahmed struggled for electoral alliance and finally succeeded in developing Pakistani Islamic Front (PIF) along with some other minor groups and parties to contest these elections.

The most united alliance considered at that time was Muttahida Deeni Mahaz (MDM) negotiated and formed by Molana Sami-ul-Haq with other about twenty-four religio-political parties to contest this election and gain the electoral support to win elections strategically. Unfortunately, MDM met with a huge failure to attract and gain the attention and support of the voters and lost the chance to win a big victory as they only secured 3 slots of the National Assembly seats and failed to achieve a good proportion of electorates support. Unexpectedly, in Punjab no religio-political party remained successful in achieving even a single National Assembly seat because of PML (N)s independent contest, they won the massive share of the National Assembly slots in Punjab. Most of the solely political and combined with religio-political parties' alliances restricted and confined to only two provinces; Baluchistan and NWFP (now KPK) and therefore, the strength of such alliances broken-down and viewed as the lesser effective political alliances to capture and mobilize a sizeable proportion of voters and supporters during elections. The following table 3 highlights the electoral performance of various alliances and independent parties during the 1993 elections.

Table 3: Electoral performance of political parties in 1993 elections

Political Party	Muslim Seats						
	Punjab	Sindh	NWFP	Baluchistan	Federal Capital	FATA	Total
ANP	None	None	3	None	None	None	3
BNM-H	None	None	None	1	None	None	1

IJM	None	None	4	None	None	None	
JWP	None	None	None	None	None	None	2
MDM	None	None	None	None	None	None	3
NDA	None	None	None	None	None	None	1
NPP	None	1	None	None	None	None	1
PIF	None	1	2	None	None	None	3
PKQP	None	None	None	None	None	None	1
PML-J	6	None	None	None	None	None	6
PML-N	52	10	9	None	1	None	72
PPP	47	33	5	1	None	None	86
Independent	5	1	1	1	None	7	15
Vacant							5

Source: elections.com.pk

The formation of IJI, its ups and downs and performance in elections of the 1988, 1990 and finally its dissolution just before the contest of the 1993 elections highlight that this religio-political alliance similar to previous alliances was the need of the hour at that time to oppose and hinder the winning ways for non-compliance political parties with the establishment. When the establishment as Gul (2009) admitted in his interview that GHQ played a key role in the formation and propagation of IJI through media; electronic and print along with technical support to contest elections against PPP. This alliance remained fruitful and blessed for PML (N) that for the first time Nawaz Sharief got a political boost from IJI platform and up till now he and his party are enjoying a lasting political control over national as well as Punjab provincial assembly as since 1988 they have been sitting either on government or opposition benches in the parliament.

Role of Media in IJI Alliance Formation and Success:

According to the electoral history scholars of Pakistan such as Shafqat (1997), Malik (2015), and Gul (2009) to name a few, the 1988 elections were pledged and weren't contested neutral due to the intervene of media, the government, and establishment. The number of average contesting candidates was 6.4 for each NA seat, however, the voters' interest and turnout at the election were comparatively low to the last elections with only 42%. The major political powers were three that were in winning position; MQM, PPP, and IJI. The PPP won the elections despite having much popularity among people before elections, PPP only secured a surface win instead of a clean sweep as was expected. The basic reason behind the PPP's hard time was the projection of the IJI. The aficionados of the IJI made every effort internationally and externally to prevent the leading position of the PPP during elections.

For this purpose, the media played a very crucial role in molding public opinion in opposition to the PPP and favor of the IJI. The caretaker government before the elections and after the accidental death of General Zia-ul-Haq in 1988, canceled General Ayub Khan's infamous PPO (Press and Publication Ordinance) and replaced with another ordinance RPPNO (Registration of Printing Presses and Newspapers Ordinance). The establishment used this ordinance to promote its agendas, in particular, projected IJI and defamed PPP. Any of the ordinance issues about the media was never become a parliamentary decision or act rather a special ordinance imposed every time. This new media regulatory ordinance sustained to be reissued after every four months' time through presidential ordinance until the early in 1991 (Parveen & Bhatti, 2018, p. 15).

With the help of media and establishment, the IJI also promulgated false and negative propaganda about the PPP and their leading candidate Benazir Bhutto, however, Bhutto remained firm and confident during all these negative views and handled the situation skillfully. Irrespective of opponents' propagandas, Bhutto kept her party united and succeeded in achieving the electoral support of various factional chiefs of the tribes and leaders to win the elections in 1988. According to Shafqat (1997), the political alliances, the role of media and establishment during the 1988 elections took the country towards "the process of re-democratization" (p. 227).

It was not the first time that the media and religious sentiments had been used to defame the opponents by ruling or affiliated parties with the establishment agendas. During the 1965 elections, Miss Fatima Jinnah, sister of the founder of Pakistan Muhammad Ali Jinnah, contested as the candidate for the president of Pakistan by Combined Opposition Parties (COP) against General Ayub Khan. Ayub Khan won the elections with heavy mandate while Miss Fatima Jinnah lost due to official interference of establishment that misused government machinery, resources, and funds to promote a one-sided point of view of the ruling party. Similar to the IJI's status in the 1988 elections where all official resources and support were with them to contest against the PPP. Miss Fatima Jinnah was bounded to promote her political agenda and didn't find a proper platform or freedom to express her point of view. Whereas, Ayub Khan had the support of the establishment, the state-owned electronic and print media to promote his point of views. The media instead of being neutral was used as a handy tool to defame COP and distort its image among people. Besides this marginalization, a *fatwa* from the religious scholars had been obtained and propagated through media that a woman cannot hold the responsibilities of a Muslim state at all (Malik, 2014, p. 59).

Besides electronic and print media, during 1988 elections and onwards a new trend used to gain public attention was posters and paintings. Behind the formation of the IJI alliance, PML (N) used the idea of Islamization to attract public attention as in Pakistan it is very easy to gain public support by using religious sentiments. Similarly, other parties like PPP also used posters with Benazir Bhutto and her father's pictures along with religious symbols on them to hijack public emotions for electoral support.

Moreover, the media was used in every form; electronic, print and posters, etc. as a tool to support the IJI coalition and distort the very image of the PPP; it was a strong resisting force for the establishment and PML alliance. Full coverage was given to one party and others had been marginalized in many ways through media such as it was propagated through media that PPP was pro-Indian and they had financial and technical support from them (Malik, 2015, p. 61).

However, the Supreme Court of Pakistan gave a ruling in air marshal Asghar Khan case in which the ISI, establishment and president's office found involved in promoting IJI to stop the PPP from a winning lead in the 1990 elections. The verdict was given by a bench of three supreme court judges; Justice Jawad Khawaja, Justice Arif Hussain and the worthy Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Ch. The bench of Supreme Court issued the short order² after hearing a petition filed in 1996 by Khan requesting the court to look into allegations that the Inter-Services Intelligence had financed many politicians in the 1990 election by dishing out Rs140 million to create the *Islami Jamhoori Ittihad* (IJI) and stop Benazir Bhutto's PPP from coming to power. The petition was based on an affidavit of Durrani (Dawn, October 2012). The Supreme Court in its short order ruled that there was ample evidence to suggest that the 1990 election was rigged and that a political cell maintained by the then-president Ghulam Ishaq Khan supported the formation of the IJI to stop a victory of the PPP. The ruling of SC said that Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Baig and Durrani violated the Constitution during the 1990 election by supporting IJI and rigging elections.

Conclusion:

The political history of Pakistan has been filled with various alliances since the very first elections. The policies of interdependence and interconnectedness among political, religious and state agents are considered primary foundations behind the political legitimization and consider these policies as one of the pillars of the state. However, when the political parties prefer their benefits over national interests, they lose their credibility and at last vanish. Similarly, the political alliances among different parties with different ideologies can only be successful when their leaders remain loyal and willing to sacrifice their personal benefits and egos for the development and betterment of the alliance. Unfortunately, despite having strong support from the media, establishment and big political parties, IJI remained to fail to increase its vote bank and popularity among masses.

The present article is an attempt to discuss the role of media and establishment in formation and propagation of one of the most crucial and controversial alliances in the electoral history of Pakistan *Islami Jamhoori Ittihad* (IJI). This study, through media reports, books, judicial verdicts, and academic articles highlight two basic myths associated with the IJI formation and promotion; first, it is believed that the establishment through state resources formed and promoted IJI that later proved in the Supreme Court verdict in 2012.

² The original copy of the supreme court verdict is available at http://i.dawn.com/2012/10/asghar_khan_case_short_order_s-m-c-no-19of1996dt19-10-20121.pdf

Secondly, this alliance formed to oppose the growing political strength of Pakistan Peoples' Party and to prevent it to make government. Furthermore, this article exposes why IJI didn't succeed to maintain its alliance for a longer period and the failure of the religio-political parties to attract the voters' attention. A closer reading of the causes that formed IJI and reasons that caused dissolution and defame of IJI highlight that every party and instituted that involved directly and indirectly to make this alliance preferred personal interests and they could save this alliance if their priority was national interests more than personal ones. Therefore, this paper concludes that the IJI alliance was a need of the hour for the establishment to control the political strength of PPP and when it was fulfilled, the establishment stopped its support and IJI dissolved.

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