GPS Spoofing Framework to Attack Civilian GPS Receivers on Drones and Other Systems

Abstract

Drones are becoming more popular, with a variety of uses in both commercial and military applications. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are already being utilized in battle and may carry a variety of missiles, such as the USA's "MQ-8B Fire Scout." Indeed, even new warrior jets have been altered to work as completely independent automated flying vehicles (UAVs). We show how to introduce programming for GPS signal age and transmission, as well as a Python script for recovering robot information. We utilize the Python module Pymavlink to get a robot's status, for example, position and speed data from the GPS crude info or intertwined information from the EKF, utilizing the MAVLink convention on a UDP port. We research weakness in these automated frameworks from both a product and equipment viewpoint, with a specific accentuation on the security of non military personnel GPS recipients on customer drones that use the increasingly ubiquitous software-defined radio cards. We talked about GPS location ideas and data formats, as well as the software and hardware platforms used in GPS spoofing attacks. and the control and communication protocol for a consumer drone. Then, using trials, we proposed a realistic GPS spoofing attack framework. Our findings reveal that the drone is subject to such attacks and that it is possible to cause the drone to divert from its intended path.